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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LUIS G. STELZNER*

INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico courts considered a variety of criminal cases during the Survey year. These cases fall into no easy categories, and are
generally divided here according to those provisions of the United
States Constitution that they construe. Cases involving grand jury
questions and the Habitual Offender Act are treated separately.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. ProbableCause
The confidential informant is a major source of police information leading to arrests and searches. In New Mexico a new source of
such information is achieving currency. That source is the anonymous informant produced by Crimestoppers Programs. Several
questions regarding the use of confidential and anonymous informants and the disclosure of their identities came before New Mexico
courts during the Survey year. The courts also considered secondhand sources of probable cause and re-evaluated the scope of review
of probable cause on the appellate level.
1. Confidential Informants
One New Mexico case dealt with the procedure for the disclosure
of the identity of a confidential informant. It is settled that hearsay
information provided by confidential informants may form the basis
for a finding of probable cause to arrest or search.' The basic test for
gauging the validity of such tips was set forth some years ago in
Aguilar v. Texas.I
[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the nar*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (Jones was overruled in United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 8 (1980), to the extent that Jones gave automatic standing to those objecting to a search which discovered evidence used against them); see also Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
2. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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cotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the
informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, ...
was
"credible" or his information "reliable." 3
In Spinelli v. United States4 The Court further explained Aguilar.
Where one or both of the two prongs of the Aguilar test were not
met, sufficient independent corroboration by the police of information in the tip could satisfy the test.
The two-pronged Aguilar test was applied by the New Mexico
Court of Appeals in State v. Ramirez.5 The important contribution
of the Ramirez decision, however, is its elaboration of the procedure
for dealing with the always delicate question of disclosure of the
identity of a confidential informant. 6 Generally, under Rule 510 of
the New Mexico Rules of Evidence the state need not disclose the
identity of a confidential informant.' Ramirez makes it clear that a
regulatory exception to that "privilege" is triggered when a defendant who seeks disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant
makes a preliminary showing that "the informant would be helpful
or necessary to the defense." ' In Ramirez the defense made such a
showing with its claim that the informant was present during the
narcotics transaction and could provide information relevant to a
defense of entrapment. 9 The court held that the defendant had made
the requisite showing, and was therefore entitled to an in camera
hearing during which the judge, through testimony or affidavits,
could determine whether the informant's testimony would indeed be
helpful. In Ramirez, the trial court first granted and then denied
such a hearing. The court of appeals ruled the denial to be erron3. Id. at 114.
4. 393 U.S. 410(1969).
5. 95 N.M. 202, 619 P.2d 1246 (Ct. App. 1980). The court there upheld a search warrant
based on an informant's tip because the affidavit: (1) indicated that the informant personally
observed the drugs which were sought on the person who was searched pursuant to the
warrant-meeting the first part of the Aguilar test, and (2) stated that the informant had provided information in the past which had resulted in four arrests and convictions on controlled
substance charges, which met the second prong. The affiant/officer had also done a significant
amount of corroboration of the information provided by the informant and of other
suspicious activity on the part of defendant and his accomplice.
6. N.M. R. Evid. 510(a). "The ...

state . . . has a privilege to refuse to disclose the iden-

tity of a person who has furnished information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a
possible violation of law . ... "
7. Id. See also, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
8. 95 N.M. at 204, 619 P.2d at 1248. N.M. R. Evid. 510(c)(2) states: "If it appears. . . that
an informer will be able to give testimony that is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, . . . the judge shall give the state . . . an opportunity to show in camera facts rele-

vant to determining whether the informer can, in fact, supply the testimony."
9. 95 N.M. at 205, 619 P.2d at 1249.
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eous, but also concluded that dismissal, the relief required by Rule
510,10 was inappropriate because the state had demonstrated that
after reasonable efforts it had been unable to locate the informant.II
Thus the court in Ramirez specified the sequence of steps to be
followed where defendant seeks the identity of a confidential informant. Though Rule 510 contains the basic procedure, the court goes
beyond the plain language of Rule 510 to explicate the kind of
defense showing required to obtain an in camera hearing and to
recognize a new "unavailability" type of exception to the drastic
relief mandated by Rule 510.
2. Anonymous Informants-Crimestoppers' Tips
Increasingly, police are using "Crimestoppers" informants as
sources for probable cause to search or arrest. Often these informants supply their tips to the police anonymously over the telephone.' 2 In two cases during the Survey year, New Mexico's
appellate courts considered search warrant affidavits based substantially on information provided anonymously through Crimestoppers
programs.
Before the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Jones'3 it was open to question in New Mexico whether anonymous
"Crimestoppers" informants would be reviewed under the Aguilar/
Spinelli standards developed for application to confidential informants. " It has been argued that anonymous informants should
be considered inherently less reliable than ordinary police informants. 5 The ordinary confidential informant is at least known to
10. N.M. R. Evid. 510(c)(2):
If the judge finds that there is reasonable probability that the informer can give the
testimony [that is relevant and helpful to the defense], and the state . . . elects not to
disclose his identity, the judge on motion of the defendant [or on his own motion] in a
criminal case shall dismiss the charges to which the testimony would relate.
II. 95 N.M. at 205, 619 P.2d at 1249.

12. The informants are paid through a number system which maintains the informants'
anonymity.
13. 96 N.M. 14, 627 P.2d 409 (1981).
14. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

15. Though no cases appear to have enunciated standards for dealing with crimestoppers informants, several jurisdictions have considered anonymous informants and their credibility.
Several points can be induced from those cases. First, information from an anonymous tipster
fails to meet the "credibility" of the informant prong of Aguilar. Second, the courts do not
treat anonymous informants as citizen informants whose tips are inherently credible. Third,

some courts allow information from an anonymous source to go to a showing of reasonable
suspicion, but not probable cause. Finally, those one or two courts that have found probable

cause based solely on tips from anonymous informants have had before them substantial independent corroboration by the authorities of detailed information from the tipsters. See
Henighan v. United States, 433 A.2d 1059 (App. D.C. 1981); Hetland v. State, 387 So.2d 963
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the police and is currying favor with them. He can be brought to
task if his information is faulty. The anonymous informant, on the
other hand, is known to no one, not even the police, and thus is unaccountable for incorrect information.
Without directly treating this issue, the supreme court in State v.
Jones' 6 indicated that the anonymous informant would be subjected
to ordinary application of the Aguilar/Spinelli test. In Jones, a
police officer who was manning the phones of the Crimestoppers
program received a call from an anonymous informant. The caller
stated that he had been in Jones' apartment within the last twelve
hours and Jones had shown him narcotics and bragged that they had
been obtained by burglarizing several pharmacies in the Albuquerque area. Jones had stated that he had gained entry to two pharmacies through the roof and one pharmacy through the window.
The caller further described Jones, his apartment, and his car and
stated that Jones had said that he transported narcotics in his car.
Officers checked the department records which revealed that three
recent unsolved burglaries of Albuquerque pharmacies had been
committed with a modus operandias described by the citizen informant. The modus operandi of the burglaries had not been publicly
revealed by the police.
The police undertook surveillance of Jones' apartment. Jones was
observed by police officers emerging from that apartment and getting into the car described by the informant. Jones matched the informant's description. The officers arrested him and searched his
person. They found what they believed to be controlled substances. '
Applying the United States Supreme Court's formula in Spinelli,
the court in Jones found that the independent corroboration by the
police of the informant's description of the modus operandi (which
had not been made public) was sufficient to demonstrate the informant's credibility. The court so held despite the absence of any other
indication of why the police believed that their anonymous Crimestopper's informant was credible.
State v. Brown'" was remanded by the supreme court to the court
of appeals for reconsideration in light of the supreme court's opin(Fla. 1980). (Both cases based a finding of reasonable suspicion on information provided by
anonymous informants.) State v. Sider, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (insufficient
corroboration of an anonymous tip to justify a stop); State v. Hasenbank, 425 A.2d 1330 (Me.
1981) (corroborated tip from anonymous informant justifies stop and frisk).
16. 96 N.M. 14, 627 P.2d 409 (1981).
17. Id. at 15, 627 P.2d at 410.
18. 96 N.M. 10, 626 P.2d 1312 (Ct. App. 1981). For an in-depth analysis of State v. Jones
and State v. Brown, see Note, Search & Seizure-Search Warrants-Probable Cause-Reliability of Confidential& Anonymous Informants-State v. Brown, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 517.
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ion in Jones. The court of appeals maintained its prior decision that
the warrants were invalid, and distinguished Jones.
The Brown affidavits contained three separate tips. The first was
from a confidential informant who was found in possession of a tennis racket stolen in the burglary under investigation. This tip indicated that the informant had "learned that this burglary had been
committed by Marvin and Melvin Brown, and that the confidential
informant was concerned for his safety, and a member in good
standing of the community with no arrest record." The police then
received an anonymous Crimestoppers tip that the Browns had supplied socks, similar to those stolen in the burglary, to a cheerleading
team. Finally, a second Crimestoppers tip informed that the Browns
had been seen selling tennis equipment and had a large supply of
stolen equipment in their rear bedroom.
The Brown court held that tips from the confidential informant
and the first anonymous informant met neither prong of the Aguilar
test. The tips provided no "substantial basis for believing the source
of the hearsay to be credible [nor] for believing that there is a factual
basis for the information furnished." 9 Informant tip number three
may have spoken from personal observation and thus satisfied the
second prong of the Aguilar test, but there was nothing in that tip to
support the informant's credibility. The court distinguished Jones by
noting the total absence of any corroboration of a unique "M.O."
The court of appeals concluded by stating that even the aggregate
of all three tips did not add up to a showing of probable cause.
Citing Spinelli, the court said "that an aggregate of discrete bits of
information, each of which is defective, does not add up to the establishment of probable cause." 2o
The Brown decision appears to overstate the reach of Spinelli and
to ignore the earlier United States Supreme Court decision in Jones
v. United States.' Spinelli says only that limited amounts of otherwise innocent information, even if corroborated by the police, do
not provide sufficient detail or corroboration to convert an affidavit
which is otherwise insufficient under Aguilar into one which
demonstrates probable cause.2 In Jones v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the warrant before it, finding that
there was a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay information
provided in the affidavit by the confidential informant. The Court
observed that the informant's story was corroborated by "other
19.
20.
21.
22.

See N.M. R. Crim. P. 17(f).
96 N.M. at 13, 626 P.2d at 1315.
362 U.S. 257(1960).
393 U.S. at 418-19.
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sources." 23 These "sources" were other tips from other confidential
informants which by themselves would not have supported a finding
of probable cause.2 ' A similar situation was present in Brown. Consequently, it appears that the last portion of Brown might bear
reconsideration.
3. Second-hand Sources of Information
In State v. Martinez,25 a case of first impression in New Mexico,
the New Mexico Supreme Court considered the issue of second-hand
sources of information. Often in making arrests or searches, particularly in exigent circumstances, police officers must rely for
descriptions and other information upon second-hand sources of
information, such as radio dispatchers. The United States Supreme
Court, in Whiteley v. Warden, 2 held that officers are not required to
check out the dispatcher's source of information and the reliability
of that source.
In Martinez, the court relied on Whiteley v. Warden, and held that
effective law enforcement requires that a police officer called upon
by a dispatcher or other officer to execute an arrest or search is entitled to assume that the officer requesting the aid has probable cause
to justify the intrusion. Quoting from Whiteley, the state supreme
court observed that where such probable cause is absent at the
source, an otherwise illegal intrusion "cannot be insulated from
challenge by the decision of the investigating officer to rely on fellow
officers . . ." to make the arrest or search.27
4. Scope of Appellate Review of Probable Cause
In State v. Martinez,2 8 the supreme court also reconsidered its
long-standing rule on the scope of review by an appellate court of a
finding of probable cause to arrest or search. Martinez overruled
State v. Deltenre,2 and Rodriguez v. State,3 0 which had held that the
facts to be examined on appeal are only those facts elicited at the
hearing on the motion to suppress. The court stated that an appellate
court "may determine if probable cause did or did not exist by an examination of all the record surrounding an arrest or search and sei23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

362 U.S. at 271.
See also, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 576 (1971).
94 N.M.436, 612 P.2d 228 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 959 (1980).
401 U.S. 560 (1971).
94 N.M. at 438, 612 P.2d at 230.
94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 959 (1980).
77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976 (1967).
91 N.M. 700, 580 P.2d 126 (1978).
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zure." 31 An appellate court may now consider not only the record of
the hearing on the motion to suppress, but also the record of trial
and presumably that of any evidentiary hearing before the trial
court. The court noted that the new rule would enable appellate
courts "to truly and fully determine the legality or illegality of an

arrest or search ....

"32

In State v. Padilla, the court of appeals substantially extended
the Martinez rule on scope of review. The court in Padillaconsidered
the admissibility of a second statement by the defendant after a first
confession had been improperly induced by references to leniency.
Under State v. Austin, 43 after a first statement has been suppressed,
the burden is upon the state to show that the second statement was
voluntary. In Padilla, three questions directed by the police to the
defendant in the course of taking the second statement referred to
his first statement. The Padilla court, reviewing the record on the
motion to suppress under Martinez, found that references to the first
statement which were contained in the second statement showed connection with, rather than separation from, the first statement. The
court said that ordinarily, such a connection would require suppression of the second statement as tainted by the first. 35 Citing Martinez, 36 the Padillacourt nevertheless sustained the admission of the
second statement
into evidence, despite the state's burden to prove
37
no taint.

The court indicated that it must consider the entire record including the record of the defendant's trial, not just the record of the
suppression hearing when dealing with a suppression question. The
court stated that it was the defendant's burden as appellant to furnish a sufficient record on the issues raised on appeal, and that as an
appellate court it was bound to resolve all inferences in favor of the
trial court's ruling. The defendant's docketing statement indicated
that he took the stand and testified on his own behalf. A transcript
of that testimony was not included in the record on appeal. The
court of appeals concluded that it was bound to assume that the trial
court's ruling was correct.
In Padillathe court appears to have inferred from the absence of a
record of defendant's trial testimony, that such testimony contained
31. 94 N.M. at 439,612 P.2d at 231.
32. Id.
33. 95 N.M. 86, 619 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1980).
34. 91 N.M. 586, 577 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1978).
35. 95 N.M. at 87, 619 P.2d at 191.
36. State v. Martinez, 94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 959 (1980).
See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
37. 95 N.M. at 88, 619 P.2d at 192.
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evidence adverse to his claim on the motion to suppress. The implications of State v. Padilla for defendants appealing from the denial
of a motion to suppress are substantial. In order to protect themselves from this type of negative inference they must include in the
record on appeal transcripts of all testimony which might conceivably bear on the motion to suppress. Such a requirement seems
an unnecessary and expensive extension of State v. Martinez.
B. The WarrantRequirement
The New Mexico courts considered the warrant requirement in
several cases during the Survey period. Generally a warrant is required before a search can be made. The warrant must be based
upon probable cause, and probable cause must be determined by a
" 'neutral and detached magistrate,' and not by 'the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' ,,38
Several exceptions to the warrant requirement have developed
through the years. Some of these exceptions were discussed in New
Mexico in the past year.
1. The Automobile Exception and Container Searches
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement
developed in Carrollv. United States31 and Chambers v. Maroney."
Under the automobile exception, vehicles legitimately stopped on the
highway may be searched without a warrant where they are stopped
if there is probable cause to search. These vehicles also may be
searched later at the station if probable cause still exists." The
theory underlying this exception is that while "[tihe word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
fades away and disappears,""' automobiles generally possess an inherent mobility,' 3 and one has a lesser expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle. "
The United States Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Sanders"5 and
Chadwick v. United States"' and the New Mexico courts have held
that the Carroll/Chambersrationale is not applicable to searches of
38. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969), quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
39. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
40. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
41. Id. at 52.
42. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
43. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50 (1970).
44. United States. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364(1976).
45. 422 U.S. 753 (1979).
46. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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some containers, such as luggage."7 The courts have reasoned that
such containers are surrounded by greater expectations of privacy
and are inherently easier to secure than are automobiles. Consequently, absent particular exigency, searches of luggage and containers must be made pursuant to a warrant.
During the Survey year the New Mexico appellate courts continued to confront the task of applying the Chadwick/Sanders
analysis to containers other than luggage. In State v. White,4 the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's suppression of marijuana
seized in a warrantless search of cardboard boxes and bags found in
the trunk of a car stopped by the border patrol at a checkpoint. The
court emphasized that "whether a warrant is required to search a
container which has been seized depends upon the facts concerning
the container."" 9 In this case the court stressed that "the boxes were
closed and at least partially sealed by tape. . . . [T]he bags were of
solid material, not 'mesh' . . . . The bags were closed and tied at
the top.""0 In light of these facts, the court of appeals held that "the
trial court could properly rule that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in these items. A warrant was required to search these
items. ' ' I
The second "container case" decided during the Survey year was
State v. Capps.5 2 In Capps, several large, very dark trash bags and a
brown grocery bag were in the trunk of a car which was detained by
police. The tops of the trash bags were rolled and taped shut. The
grocery sack had the top rolled but was not sealed. The trial court
admitted the evidence seized from the containers. The court of
appeals, however, saw no basic difference between the facts before it
and those in White and found White to be controlling. The court
reversed the trial court and required a warrant to search.
Capps may conflict with, and indeed overrule sub silentio, the
1979 decision of the court of appeals in State v. Smith.53 The Smith
court sustained the trial court's finding that no warrant was required
47. Robbins v. California, 69 L.Ed. 2d 744 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. State v. Walker, 93 N.M. 769, 605 P.2d
1168 (Ct. App. 1980). But see, New York v. Belton, 69 L.Ed. 2d 768 (1981) (where auto occupant is arrested in or near that auto, the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle including
any closed containers therein may be searched incident to that arrest).
48. 94 N.M. 687, 615 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1980).
49. Id. at 688, 615 P.2d at 1005.
50. Id. at 689, 615 P.2d at 1006.
51. Id.
52. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 15 (April 9, 1981), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 911 (1981).
[Ed. note: After this article was written, the supreme court decided to hear the case and reversed the court of appeals. 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 219 (Jan. 27, 1982).]
53. 94 N.M. 379, 610 P.2d 1208 (1980).
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to search a tan plastic garbage bag found behind the passenger seat
of a car. The drugs found in Smith were contained in small plastic
bags within the large garbage bag and could not be seen.
Shortly after Capps was decided, the United States Supreme Court
decided Robbins v. California,5" which made it evident that Capps
represents a proper view of the law on container searches, and that
State v. Smith is no longer good law. In Robbins the Court found no
distinction between containers used to transport personal effects
such as suitcases or footlockers, and "flimsier containers" such as
plastic bags.55 It held that unless a closed container is such that its
contents are exposed to plain view, those contents are wholly protected by the fourth amendment under Chadwick and Sanders.56
2. Exigent Circumstances
In State v. Perea"7 the court of appeals applied the broad "exigent
circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement to a case involving "evanescent" evidence. 58 While defendant was at the
hospital his hands were wiped with a cotton swab soaked in nitric
acid solution to test for the presence of gunfire residue. A warrant is
usually required for such a search absent exigent circumstances.
Though there was probable cause, no warrant was in fact obtained.
The trial court upheld the intrusion. The court sustained the warrantless search on the ground that the intrusion was minimal, and
that the hospital procedure to cleanse patients brought to the emergency room immediately created the necessary exigency to dispense
with the warrant requirement. The court cited to Cupp v. Murphy',
in which the United States Supreme Court held that where probable
cause obtained, the police were justified "in subjecting [defendant]
to the very limited search [taking scrapings from his fingernails]
necessary to preserve highly evanescent evidence [blood] .... ,,60
54. 69 L.Ed. 2d 744 (1981). On October 13, 1981, the United States Supreme Court granted
review in United States v. Ross, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265. Ross involves the warrantless search of a
paper bag found in the trunk of a vehicle during a lawful search thereof. The court ordered the
parties to address the question whether it should reconsider Robbins. See 30 Crim. L. Rep.
1005. Robbins is particularly vulnerable. The opinion of the court was signed by only three
justices. Its author, Justice Stewart, is no longer on the Court. Moreover, it is difficult to see a
principled and meaningful basis for distinction between Robbins and New York v. Belton, 69
L.Ed. 2d 768 (1981).
55. 69 L.Ed. 2d at 750-751.
56. Id.
57. 95 N.M. 777, 626 P.2d 851 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412
(1981).
58. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
59. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
60. Id. at 296.
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Perea seems to be a legitimate application of the Cupp v. Murphy
analysis because the chemical substances on the defendant's skin
might have been washed away under the hospital procedure if the
officers had taken the time to seek a warrant.
3. State Action
State v. Perea6 ' also contains a briefly-discussed, but interesting
question regarding the warrant requirement-state action. In Perea,
defendant was hospitalized after his arrest. The emergency room
nurse, as was her custom when she believed a crime was involved,
took his shirt. She later turned it over to the police. The court of
appeals held that there was no fourth amendment violation because
there was no govenmental intrusion.
The court did not discuss any evidence of prior arrangement between the nurse and police. The evidence that such seizures were routine in cases of suspected criminal involvement indicates, however,
that the nurse or the emergency room staff as a whole may have been
acting as agents of the police in taking the shirt. In cases of such an
agency relationship most courts have found sufficient state action to
trigger fourth amendment protections.6 2
An even more interesting "state action" case with potentially
broad implications is State v. Ryder. " In Ryder a tribal police officer, Rocha, who was not cross-commissioned as a state police
officer, stopped the non-Indian defendant, Pressing, for going
through a stop sign within the Mescalero Apache Reservation.
Rocha realized that because he was not a state police officer he could
not issue a citation for violation of a state traffic law. 6' Rocha then
called Officer Chino, who was a commissioned New Mexico peace
officer. Rocha detained6 Pressing during the ten minutes it took
Chino to arrive. During that detention Rocha obtained information
which gave him probable cause to believe that Pressing's vehicle contained marijuana. Based on that information, searches were made
which yielded over 100 pounds of marijuana. Defendants successfully moved to suppress the marijuana on the ground that because
61. 95 N.M. 777,626 P.2d 851 (1981), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 17,627 P.2d 412 (1981).
62. See, e.g., State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974) (state action found where
suppressed marijuana seized by store manager after manager consulted with police prior to
seizure); Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967
(1968) (participation in planning by police was government action when private agent seized
credit card).
63. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 383 (Ct. App. April 2, 1981), cert. granted.
64. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-124 & -125 (1978); 66-1-4(49) (Cum. Supp. 1981); and
29-1-11 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
65. See text accompanying note 119 infra.
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Rocha had no authority to detain the defendant, the detention was
illegal and the marijuana was the fruit of that illegality." The court
of appeals reversed the trial court. As an alternative ground 67 for its
reversal it held that there was no constitutional violation in the
detention because there was no governmental action.68
The court reasoned that by stripping Rocha of any police authority in this case, defendant's argument converted the Indian officer
into a private citizen. This deprived his conduct of the requisite
''governmental participation to invoke the constitutional protection
69

against an unreasonable search."

Had Rocha been acting in a private capacity, the most analogous
cases would be those involving searches by off-duty police officers.
"Generally, the courts have responded that such a search is private if
the off-duty officer was at the time acting as a private individual
rather than as a policeman." 7
Officer Rocha, however, was not off-duty when he stopped Pressing's vehicle. He was on-duty. Rocha was not acting in his private
capacity (e.g., acting as a parent, friend, or neighbor). He was acting
solely as a police officer. Indeed the court of appeals itself concluded
that the presence of Rocha as a uniformed officer in an official
police car was enough to constitute a stop for fourth amendment
purposes'.7 Officer Rocha was in the uniform of a tribal police officer. In that capacity he stopped defendant's vehicle for a violation of
tribal law. He subsequently detained defendant for arrest on a violation of state law. Under those facts, it is difficult to see how the
66. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 384.
67. See text accompanying note 119 infra.
68. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 386.
69. Id.
70. W. LaFave, Search & Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 113 (1978), citing
to People v. Wachter, 58 Cal. 3d 911, 130 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976) (off-duty deputy sheriff went
fishing with friend, friend then went to home of acquaintance to show deputy a barn with distinctive features, deputy while on property saw marijuana growing; held, private search);
People v. Topp, 40 Cal. 3d 372, 114 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1974) (off-duty police officer accompanied
friend to friend's home which friend shared with another, remained in living room while friend
searched bedroom of other occupant and found drugs; held, "there was no state action involved and the evidence was properly admissible"); State v. Roccasecca, 130 N.J. Super. 585,
328 A.2d 35 (1974) (off-duty police lieutenant employed part-time as security consultant at factory searched for evidence of gambling there; held, this is a police search, as there was "no
evidence that the investigation of lottery activities came within the scope of his employment"
at the factory); State. v. Schlabach, 25 Or. App. 525, 549 P.2d 1283 (1976) (deputy sheriff went
on neighbor's property to retrieve horse, discovered marijuana; case remanded because trial
judge failed to determine if deputy was acting in his official capacity at the time); Moore v.
State, 562 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. 1978) (neighbor of off-duty officer asked him to search van
parked in front of her house; held, a police search, as "an officer is for many purposes on duty
24 hours a day.").
71. See text accompanying notes 119 and 120 infra.
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court could characterize his actions except as those of an agent of the
state."
The decision in Ryder is unprecedented. 7 3 Courts have generally
held that searches by persons less cloaked with the mantle of police
authority than officer Rocha constitute state action. For instance,
searches by private persons acting as agents for the police,"' and
searches by nonpolice public employees have been held to be state
action."
There are two additional difficulties with the state action analysis
in Ryder. First, the defendant's claim was not a constitutional one,
but was statutory. The state action analysis was therefore inappropriate.7 6 Second, the court's reasoning could lead to unacceptable
results. For example, out-of-uniform officers could make traffic
arrests beyond their authority under N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-124
(1978)"' and violate a suspect's fourth amendment rights with impunity.
C. Consent Searches
During the survey year New Mexico courts either reaffirmed or
clarified several significant points regarding the validity of consent
searches. In State v. White,7 the court of appeals simply reaffirmed
its previously established deference to the trial court in its findings of
fact as to whether the defendant validly consented. 79
The question of whether motivation or intent of a consenting
party has some bearing on the validity of that person's consent 0
typically arises where an estranged or alienated spouse consents to
72. No officer acts within his authority when he acts unconstitutionally. No one would
argue, however, that such unconstitutional conduct reduces the offending officer to the status
of private citizen, thus rendering his conduct beyond the pale of the constitution.
73. See generally, W. LaFave, Search & Seizure-A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
110-45 (1978) for a thorough discussion of the state action requirement under the fourth
amendment. There is no mention therein of any case similar in its material facts to Ryder.
74. See, e.g., Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v.
Dembo, 451 Pa. 1, 301 A.2d 689 (1973); People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d 505
(1955); People v. Fierro, 236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1965).
75. See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971).
76. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 384-85.
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-124 (1978): "No person shall be arrested for violating the Motor
Vehicle Code . . . or other law relating to motor vehicles punishable as a misdemeanor except
by a full-time, salaried peace officer who, at the time of arrest, is wearing a uniform clearly indicating his official status."
78. 94 N.M. 687,615 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1980).
79. See State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 793, 581 P.2d 1288 (Ct. App. 1978); State. v. Ruud, 90
N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1977).
80. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970). But
see Commonwealth v. Martin, 358 Mass. 282, 264 N.E.2d 366 (1970).
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the search of premises shared with the defendant. In some jurisdictions, courts have held that motivation does bear on validity of the
consent. In State v. Larson,8 ' the issue was presented to the New
Mexico Supreme Court in classic fashion. Defendant's wife took her
two daughters to the police to report that her husband had engaged
in sexual activity with the two children. She wanted the defendant
arrested and signed a written consent to search their mutual residence. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. Chief
Justice Sosa, writing for the supreme court, upheld the validity of
the consent, noting that the critical question was whether the wife
had "common authority over the premises with the defendant.
S82 The opinion in Larson apparently means that the motivation
or intent of the consenting
party has no bearing on the validity of the
83
search in New Mexico.
A type of search activity closely related to that of consent searches
is that of search as a condition of probation. In State v. Gardner,8"
the New Mexico Court of Appeals dealt thoroughly with this question. In Gardner, the defendant was on probation from a conviction
for possession of cocaine. One of the conditions of his probation
was that he submit to a search of his car, person, or residence anytime upon request of his probation officer. Defendant was suspected
by the police of involvement in a theft from a shop in Taos. His probation officer, together with police officers, went to his residence.
After defendant was informed of his condition of probation, he
opened the trunk of his car in which were found some of the stolen
items.
On appeal, defendant made two claims. He first claimed that the
evidence should be suppressed because the search was conducted by
the probation officer in violation of probation department regulations which forbade probation officers from conducting warrantless
searches.8 5 His second claim was that the search was unreasonable,
and therefore violative of his fourth amendment rights.
81. 94 N.M. 795, 617 P.2d 1310 (1980).
82. Id. at 797, 617 P.2d at 1312; see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); State v.
Madrid, 91 N.M. 375, 574 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297
(1978).
83. 94 N.M. at 797, 617 P.2d at 1312. The supreme court did not explain this conclusion in
Larson. But see United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970)
(where the court suggests that spousal antagonism would preclude "acting in harmony with the
marital relationship from which her joint right of ownership or control is derived"). Cf. Commonwealth v. Martin, 358 Mass. 282, 264 N.E.2d 366 (1970) ("while they are both living in the
premises the equal opportunity does not lapse and revive with the lapse and revival of amicable
relations between the spouses").
84. 95 N.M. 171, 619 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1980).
85. Id. at 173, 619 P.2d at 849.
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On the first point, the court agreed with the defendant's characterization of the department regulation. The court noted, however, that
New Mexico courts had no duty to enforce that regulation because
compliance with the regulation was not mandated by any federal or
state constitutional or statutory law. s6 The court found that, under
the circumstances, the specific condition of probation imposed on
the defendant overrode regulatory provisions directing probation
officers to abstain from searches of probationers.8 7
The court went on to rule on the constitutionality of this search as
a condition of probation. Citing United States v. ConsueloGonzalez,8 8 the court recognized that "a probationer's rights concerning searches are more limited than the rights of a person not on
probation." 8 9 The court noted that such limitations must be reasonable. "Reasonableness" is measured by whether the condition is
"reasonably related to his rehabilitation." 9 In this regard, the
Gardner court observed that "[a] condition of probation which requires a prior narcotics offender to submit to a search is reasonably
related to the probationer's prior criminal conduct and is aimed at
deterring or discovering subsequent criminal offenses." 9 ' The court
held, therefore, that the probation search requirement was constitutional.
The court imposed two further requirements which must be met
before a search as a condition of probation would be constitutional.
First, such a search must be reasonable as to time and manner,9 2 and
second, the search must be within the "scope of the probationary
process." 9 The court, quoting Consuelo-Gonzalez, found that
although the probation officer was accompanied by police officials
who were primarily concerned with the new criminal offense and not
with the defendant's probation, "a proper visitation by a probation
officer does not cease to be so because he is accompanied by a law
enforcement official." 9 The court also observed that the condition
imposed upon the defendant did not require submission to search
upon the request of the police officers. The condition required him
86. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727
(1980).
87. 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850.
88. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
89. 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850.
90. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20-6(E) (1978).
91. 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850.
92. Id.
93. In other words, the search must not be a subterfuge for a criminal investigation by the
police. Id. at 175,619 P.2d at 851.
94. Id.
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to submit to search only upon the request of his probation officer."'
In Gardner,the court concluded that these conditions were satisfied,
and reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence.
The court in Gardner apparently required that a search as condition of probation not be a "subterfuge for police investigation." At
the same time, the court seemed to presume absence of subterfuge
even in circumstances where the police were clearly motivated by a
desire to investigate a wholly new crime. After Gardner, defendants
will have difficulty demonstrating subterfuge.
D. Inventory Searches
In State v. Ruffino,9 6 the supreme court of New Mexico recognized the validity of inventory searches in New Mexico and set out
requirements for a valid inventory search. First, the vehicle to be inventoried must be in police control and custody based on some legal
ground, and there must be some nexus between the arrest and the
reason for the impounding. Second, the inventory must be made
pursuant to established police regulations. Third, such searches must
further one of two purposes: either the protection of the owner's
property, or protection of the police from false claims or potential
danger. Finally if during an inventory search evidence or other seizable items are discovered, a search warrant should be obtained
before the evidence is seized. 97
The United States Supreme Court, in South Dakota v.
Opperman,9 upheld inventory searches as valid under the fourth
amendment and itself set out a series of requirements for the validity
of such searches. The standards set forth in Ruffino differ somewhat
from those in Opperman. The differences in some instances limit the
scope of inventory searches in New Mexico. In others the differences
broaden that scope as compared to the standard set out in Opperman.

In several respects the requirements set out in Ruffino parallel
those in Opperman. First, Opperman similarly requires that the
vehicle be impounded pursuant to lawful authority.9 9 Oppperman
also indicated that the inventory must be conducted pursuant to established police regulations.' 0 Finally, Opperman made it clear
95. Id.
96. 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980).
97. Id. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
98. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
99. Id. at 369.
100. Id. at 370.
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that, just as with any other type of search, the scope of an inventory
search must be reasonable. Reasonableness is defined in light of the
major purposes of the inventory exception.' 0
In other respects, the Ruffino opinion differs from Opperman.
The court in Ruffino stated that "there must be some nexus between
the arrest and the reason for the impounding."' 2 In Opperman
there was no arrest of the defendant because the vehicle was impounded for being illegally parked in a tow-away zone. It seems
clear that under Opperman, at least, there need be no such nexus.
Furthermore, Ruffino suggests that a warrant should be obtained
before evidence observed during an inventory is seized.' 3 No such
requirement is mentioned in Opperman where marijuana observed
was immediately seized.' 4 In each of the two foregoing respects,
Ruffino appears to impose more restrictions on police use of inventory searches than does Opperman.
On the other hand, Ruffino either ignores precautions indicated in
Opperman or extends the application of that case in two instances.
First, Opperman suggests that an inventory search would be improper where less intrusive alternatives existed. The Supreme Court
emphasized that in Opperman "Itihe owner . . . was not present to
make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings. '"' 5
There is no similar discussion in Ruffino. Second, in Ruffino the
court concluded that it was properly within the scope of an inventory
search to open and search the trunk of the defendant's vehicle: "[t]o
forbid entry into trunks as part of an inventory search would frustrate the very purpose of the inventory since the trunk is a likely
place for valuables to be stored."' 0 6 The need for the police to protect themelves from liability for objects in their custody would
arguably justify the inventory of a trunk because it is a "likely place
for valuables to be stored."' 0 7 The protection of the owner's property, however, would not ordinarily call for the inventory of a

101. Id. at 375.
102. 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
103. Id.
104. 428 U.S. at 366.
105. Id. at 375.
106. 94 N.M.at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
107. It may be that these differences in the requirements articulated by the two courts simply
reflect the different fact settings in which the two cases arose. In Ruffino, of course, there was
an arrest, and the defendant was in custody and thus unavailable to make other arrangements
for his vehicle. In Opperman there was no arrest, and because the defendant was at large, he
might have made other arrangements.
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locked trunk because a locked trunk is reasonably invulnerable to
theft or vandalism. 108
After Ruffino, defense counsel may argue that inventory searches
in New Mexico must meet a test which combines the elements
emphasized in Ruffino with those identified in Opperman but not
noted in Ruffino. It remains to be seen in subsequent litigation
whether this combination of the two cases was the supreme court's
intent in Ruffino.
E. Stops
09
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio"
and subse0
quent decisions' has carved out a distinct area of police activity
which is governed by the fourth amendment, but is subject to less
stringent controls than the full-scale arrest or search. One such lesser
intrusion is the "stop" -typically a brief detention for some legitimate law enforcement purpose. "[Nlot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.""' A
stop occurs when an officer "by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.
'' 112 An officer does not need probable cause
to justify
the stop,
3
but rather the lesser showing of "reasonable suspicion."'
In two decisions during the survey year the New Mexico appellate
courts dealt with the intriguing question of what constitutes a
"stop" in New Mexico. In State v. Montoya"4 a motel burglary was
reported in which a set of speakers and a wallet were taken. The
manager described two suspects "as about 5 '8", Spanish males in
their teens with bushy hair and medium build." Officer White
suspected one of the Montoyas. The victim's wallet was found two
days later within a few blocks of the Montoyas' residence. Two officers went to the defendant's house and found him sitting in his car
parked beside the house. The officers were in an unmarked car and
in plain clothes. They approached defendant's car, and as they were
108. But see, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), in which the court upheld the warrantless search of the trunk of an auto incident to the caretaking function of the local police to
protect community safety. The police in Cady "were under the impression" that the incapacitated driver, a Chicago police officer, was required to carry his service revolver at all
times. The police had reason to believe the revolver might be in defendant's car, which had
been towed to an unprotected garage, and might be vulnerable to vandals.
109. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
110. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
111. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19.
112. Id.
113. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882.
114. 94 N.M. 542, 612 P.2d 1353 (Ct. App. 1980).
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identifying themelves as police officers, one of the officers saw a
stereo speaker which matched the description of one of the speakers
reported stolen.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the officers
had no "articulable facts to focus suspicion on this defendant." The
court found "there is no showing that the officers exercised any
physical force or show of authority, or restrained the defendant
prior to the time they observed the contraband in plain view in the
rear of the automobile.'" I' The court, therefore, held that there was
no fourth amendment intrusion. The court distinguished State v.
Ray," 6 and State v. Galvan,",7 in that those two decisions involved
''an investigatory intrusion into a sphere in which the defendant
could maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Galvan there
was a stopping of the automobile; in Ray, an opening of the door of
a parked pickup and a searching of its pasesengers. '"II The Montoya court concluded that no showing of reasonable suspicion was
required in that case because there was no such intrusion.
In Ray and Galvan, the courts suggested that officers needed a
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts in order to even
"approach" a suspect. Montoya clarified the language in Ray and
Galvan which seemed to go well beyond the apparent requirements
of Terry and its progeny. The court of appeals further refined the
concept of what constitutes a stop of restraint of an individual in
State v. Ryder.' " In Ryder a tribal police officer, after stopping the
defendant for a traffic violation, asked the defendant to wait in his
pickup while he called another BIA officer who was a commissioned
New Mexico peace officer. The defendant waited for about ten minutes until the second officer's arrival. There was no order by the
officer to wait, and the officer and the defendant were in their
separate cars most of the time. The court, however, concluded that
the trial court "correctly determined that the presence of a uniformed officer, in an official police car, was sufficient to induce
defendants to wait for the arrival of [the other officer]."' 20 On these
facts, the presence of the uniformed officer in the official police car
was enough to constitute a stop.' 2 '
115. Id. at 553-44, 612 P.3d at 1354-55.
116. 91 N.M. 67, 570 P.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1977).
117. 90 N.M. 129, 560 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1977).
118. State v. Montoya, 94 N.M. at 544, 612 P.2d at 1355.
119. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 385.
120. Id.
121. Id. In Ryder the court of appeals also decided the legality of the detention of nonIndian defendants by a BIA officer who was not cross-commissioned as a New Mexico peace
officer. The detention in Ryder lasted some ten minutes after the BIA officer had stopped de-
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Generally, the stops which have been considered justifiable upon a
showing of reasonable suspicion have been stops for questioning
concerning some criminal or regulatory violation. In State v. Hernandez22' the court of appeals dealt with a somewhat different
category of police activity-the detention of individuals connected
with an incident which has not yet been determined to involve any
criminal conduct at all.
In Hernandez, the officer was told that a person fitting the defendant's description was reported to have been drinking and to have
left with a one-year old child from a residence at which he had earlier
caused trouble. The officer knew the defendant. When the officer
reached the scene he recognized defendant, who was sitting in a car.
The officer told the defendant to wait while he found out what was
happening. The defendant tried to leave. The officer reached in and
turned off the ignition. An altercation began between defendant and
the officer which ultimately involved several other police officers.
Defendant was convicted of battery upon a police officer and appealed. The defendant argued that detention by a police officer is
allowable only when there is reasonable suspicion of crime committed or about to be committed or when exigent circumstances permit a brief stop to ask only identity and a few questions.I23 The court
of appeals rejected that argument and upheld the officer's limited
authority to detain the defendant.
Recognition of such a limited police authority to stop comports
with the United States Supreme Court decisions. 2 4 Application of
fendants' vehicle for a stop sign violation and detained it until a fellow officer who was crosscommissioned could arrive.
The court of appeals held that Oliphant v. Susquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978),
does not prevent a BIA officer from stopping or arresting non-Indian defendants. Oliphant
refers only to the jurisdiction of tribal courts. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court opinion at least tacitly acknowledges that such an arrest may be made so long as Indian authorities
"promptly deliver up any non-Indian offender, rather than try to punish him themelves."
In the state court's view, the BIA officer had authority under the tribal code to stop defendant and issue a tribal citation even if under New Mexico law an arrest for a state traffic violation could only be made by a uniformed full-time peace officer. It was reasonable for the officer who had authority to make the stop for a stop sign violation to detain the defendants for
approximately ten minutes under either of two circumtances: the officer might have detained
the defendants in order to arrest them on the tribal code violations and detain them for delivery
to state officials as directed in Oliphant; it would also have been reasonable for the officer to
detain the defendants so that Officer Chino, the cross-commissioned officer, could arrest them
on state charges.
A simpler solution for tribal law enforcement agencies would be simply to cross-commission
all Indian police officers in order to avoid the problems presented in Ryder. The Ryder decision
seems to make clear that even if a tribal officer is not cross-commissioned, he may stop to detain and arrest non-Indians at least for the purpose of turning them over to state authorities.
122. 95 N.M. 125, 619 P.2d 570 (Ct. App. 1980).
123. Id. at 126, 619 P.2d at 571.
124. See note I1lOsupra.
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the Supreme Court's "balancing test"' 5 to the somewhat different
type of police activity involved in Hernandez reinforces the conclusion that the intrusion would be justified upon a showing similar to
the Terry-mandate reasonable suspicion that the detainee is involved
in the activity or disturbance which the officer is investigating and
that such activity as reported with reasonable reliability' 26 to the
officer may involve criminal conduct, or the potential therefor.
F. Frisks
In State v. Harrison, '27 police officers obtained a warrant to
search a motel room and its occupant, Dionel Tenorio, for a pen
gun. The officers entered the room after knocking and found Tenorio lying on the bed with the defendant sitting on the edge of the bed.
When the defendant saw the officers she ran to the bathroom, but
was grabbed before she could reach the toilet. Because she was
female, defendant was told to pat down her pockets. The officers
could see that there was something in the pockets, but did not know
what. At trial one officer testified that he did not believe that the
bulge in defendant's pocket was a pen gun, but that he thought it
might have been some other type of weapon. During the search of
the defendant, one of the officers opened her purse and found the
pen gun inside. The search of defendant's person, nevertheless, continued.' 28 Defendant was ordered to empty her two pants pockets
and revealed a tightly packed object which contained pills and
heroin. The defendant was convicted of possession of heroin. On appeal, the court considered the validity of the search.
The court referred to State v. Blea,' 29 where the supreme court had
held that "a search for weapons is proper even though the officers
are without a reasonable belief that the person is armed and presently dangerous, so long as the person fits a class of people who are
'often armed and often will attempt to leave the scene, using their
125. In the cases cited in note 110 supra, the Supreme Court identified a distinct area of
police activity and balanced that state interest against the level of intrusion into individual
privacy interests in order to determine the appropriate fourth amendment protections. In Hernandez the state interest in effective law enforcement would seem to give an officer the authority briefly to freeze the scene of an incident to which he has been called where he has a
reasonable suspicion that a crime may have been committed, may be in process, or may be
about to be comitted. The countervailing impact on an individual's privacy is limited, and indeed, is essentially the same as that in a stop. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975).
126. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
127. 95 N.M. 383, 622 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1980).
128. Id. at 384, 622 P.2d at 289.
129. 92 N.M. 269, 587 P.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 260, 586 P.2d
1089 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
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vehicle for a "fast get away." 3 " Even prior to the court of appeals
decision in Harrison, Blea had been substantially undercut by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Ybarra v. Illinois. '3,
In Ybarra, the Court stated "the 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable
belief of suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though
that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics
search is taking place."' 32 In Harrison the court recognized this
development, overruled the trial court and held that the frisk of the
defendant was unlawful.' 33 After Harrison, reasonable suspicion to
justify a frisk in New Mexico must be particularized as to the person
to be frisked. The mere fact that an individual fits into a general
class of people is not, after Ybarra and Harrison, sufficient to
justify a frisk of that individual.' 3 Thus, in Harrison, the court of
appeals is moving in a direction consistent with that of the United
States Supreme Court in limiting the scope of Terry-type stops and
frisks.' 3 5 Blea would therefore seem no longer to be good law.
G. Fruit of The Poisonous Tree And ReasonableExpectation of
Privacy
In State v. Barry,,36 the court of appeals dealt with two interesting
concepts related to the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures:' 37 The concept of reasonable expectation of privacy, and the "inevitable discovery" exception of the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 8
In Barry, narcotics officers were tailing Marion, with whom they
had arranged through an undercover informant to buy marijuana.
The officers watched Marion drive to one of two residences, one of
which was the defendant's, to pick up the marijuana. The officers
were unable to get close enough to determine which of the residences
Marion entered for fear of alerting him. After Marion's departure
from the residence, he was arrested and, among other things, the
130. 95 N.M. at 385, 622 P.2d at 290.
131. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
132. Id. at 94.
133. 95 N.M. at 386, 622 P.2d at 291.
134. In Harrison, the court further held that even assuming that the officers had a
reasonable belief that the defendant was armed "there was no testimony that showed that they
reasonably believed that she was also presently dangerous. . . . The mere fact that she was
present while a search warrant was being executed is not sufficient." 95 N.M. at 386, 622 P.2d
at 291.
135. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
136. 94 N.M. 788, 617 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1980).
137. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.M. Const. art. 2, § 10.
138. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1979).
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officers seized from him an electronic garage door opener. The officers returned to the location of the two residences and through independent investigation developed probable cause to believe that
marijuana was contained in the defendant's residence. As they were
approaching the defendant's residence, one officer pressed the
garage door opener, and the garage door of defendant's residence
opened. As it was opening, the officer pressed the opener again, and
the garage door closed immediately. During the two to three seconds
that the garage door was open, the officers saw large amounts of
marijuana inside the garage. Using this and other information, the
officers obtained a search warrant. Pursuant to the warrant the officers seized the marijuana.' 3 9 Defendant claimed that the opening of
the door constituted an illegal search and that the warrant and subsequent search were thereby tainted by the initial illegality. The trial
court refused to suppress the marijuana.
The court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction on two
grounds. The court first decided that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his garage under the circumstances in
this case, and second, that the marijuana would have been inevitably
discovered and therefore was not proof of any initial illegality.
In reaching the first conclusion, the court reasoned that possession
by Marion of Barry's garage door opener destroyed any contention
by Barry, under the circumstances, that his expectation of privacy
was justifiable.
[W]hen one choses to dilute his exclusive possession of any
part of the premises by granting access to another, he loses the
expectation of privacy he Would otherwise enjoy, because he
then subjects his privacy to the comings and goings of another,
and to anyone else who might accompany his co-possessor or
pass within viewing range of the exposed area. 0
This analysis would seem appropriate only if it led to the conclusion that Marion, to whom defendant had loaned the garage door
opener, could validly consent to the police opening or searching the
garage. There is no indication in Barry that Marion consented to a
search of the garage.
Consent to search the property or premises of another may be
given by one who "possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."''" No court has suggested, however, that such a relation139. 94 N.M. at 789-790, 617 P.2d at 874-875.
140. Id. at 791, 617 P.2d at 876.
141. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
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ship wipes out all reasonable expectations of privacy as to any and
all persons.
The court in Barry went much farther, however, and concluded
that by handing over the garage door opener to Marion, defendant
lost any justifiable expectation of privacy in the garage, and essentially stripped himself of any fourth amendment protections as to his
garage. The court of appeals relied on cases which turn on the plain
view doctrine that one can forsake any legitimate expectation of
privacy in premises or objects where one's conduct is not calculated
to preserve that privacy.'" In Barry, however, the defendant took
reasonable measures to preserve the privacy of his garage from
public view and from the view of the police by closing the garage.
The defendant's giving the garage door opener to Marion should
have reduced or eliminated his expectation of privacy only as to
Marion.
The second basis for the court of appeals' affirmance of the
conviction in Barry was that the marijuana seized from the garage
would have inevitably been discovered by the police. With this conclusion the court adopted for the first time in New Mexico the socalled "inevitable discovery" exception to the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine. 4"3 Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, suppression
is not required even though evidence would otherwise be considered
the fruit of an initial illegality if two conditions are satisfied: "(1)
that the police have not acted in bad faith to hasten the discovery of
the questioned evidence, and (2) that there is proof the evidence
would have been found without the impermissible act, and how that
discovery would have occurred." 4 In Barry the court accepted the
facts that the officers had probable cause to obtain a search warrant
without having viewed the marijuana, and that the evidence indicated that the officers' purpose in opening the garage door was to
identify positively the residence from which they knew marijuana
had been transferred.
The court concluded that there was nothing in the record that
could support an inference of bad faith. In the court's view, the
142. The cases relied upon by the court for this proposition are Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). These cases are distinguishable from
the facts in Barry.
143. See note 131, supra.
144. 94 N.M. at 790, 617 P.2d at 875; see also,United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980)
(where the Supreme Court, while purporting not to pass on its validity, may have implicitly
sanctioned the inevitable discovery rule); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406-7, n. 12 (1977)
(where the Supreme Court in dictum suggests that on retrial evidence which it held to have been
obtained in violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) "might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event .... ").
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second condition of the inevitable discovery rule was also satisfied.
The officers had probable cause independent of the viewing of the
marijuana. They could have obtained a search warrant in any event,
and in executing the search warrant would have inevitably discovered the marijuana.'" 5
Commentators have argued that the inevitable discovery rule substantially undermines the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule by
encouraging police to shortcut more painstaking investigative techniques in favor of illegal activity.", The concept of inevitable
discovery may be so vague that it enables courts to invoke the exception in situations where the discovery would have occurred only by
the most circuitous and unusual routes.' 47 The application of the inevitable discovery rule in the context of the Barry case is unusual.
Ordinarily, the inevitable discovery in question is assumed to be a
discovery which would have been made by some means independent
of those which are challenged as illegal by the defendant.' 8 In this
case, the inevitable discovery upon which the court focused was by
means of a search pursuant to the very search warrant challenged by
the defendant.
The impact of judicial recognition of the inevitable discovery rule
in New Mexico remains to be seen. The hope is that the court will
soon give more precise guidelines for application of the defense.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. Miranda Warnings
1. Custodial Interrogation
Two decisions by the court of appeals during the Survey year
underscored the conflict that exists in New Mexico over when Miranda' 9 warnings must be given. In Miranda itself the United States
Supreme Court held that the prophylactic admonitions must be
given whenever a suspect is subjected to "custodial interroga145.
146.
Colum.
147.

State v. Barry, 94 N.M. at 790, 617 P.2d at 875.
Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the ConstitutionalExclusionaryRules, 74
L. Rev. 88, 89 (1974).
Comment, Fruitof the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments As Viewed Through its

Exceptions, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 615, 627 (1977). See also, United States v. Alvarez-Porras,
643 F.2d 54, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1981) where the second circit refused to adopt the inevitable
discovery exception. The court found that the exception was doubly flawed. First, it encourages speculation about whether police might eventually have developed a lawful basis for
discovery of the particular evidence. Second, the exception promotes conjecture about what
police might have done, or conceivably could have done to obtain the evidence lawfully.
148. See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra note 131.
149. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tion."' 5 By that phrase the Court meant anytime the defendant is
interrogated while in police custody at the station house or while
otherwise significantly deprived of his liberty. 5 ' In State v.
Bramlett, 52' officers responded to a call regarding a one-car accident. They recognized the car as one usually driven by the defendant, and found him not far from the accident scene. One officer
stopped Bramlett and asked him whether he had been driving and if
he had been in an accident. Bramlett answered "no" to both questions. The officer testified that at that point he would have "persuaded the defendant to stay had he tried to walk away." 53 The officer then asked him to get into the patrol car which the defendant did.
The two men returned to the the scene of the accident.
The court of appeals suppressed the defendant's responses to the
two questions, holding that the defendant should have been given his
Mirandawarnings prior to being asked those questions by the police.
Bramlett, when viewed together with a prior decision of the court of
appeals, State v. Wheeler, 154 indicates that in New Mexico, a defendant is entitled to his Miranda warnings whenever he is in any way
detained by the police and suspicion is focused upon him. 5I
The Wheeler/Bramlett approach is a rather strict application of
Miranda. The Miranda warnings are designed as a protection for a
suspect's fifth amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination.' 56 Therefore, Miranda itself emphasizes the inherently coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation in a policedominated situation. Most appellate courts recognize this by holding
that Mirandawarnings are not required in Terry-type stop situations
such as that which occurred in Bramlett.'57
A more conservative view of the circumstances under which
Miranda warnings are required is typified by the court of appeals
decision in State v. Montano.'s In Montano, the defendant made
her first statement to the police when they arrived at her home to investigate a homicide she had reported. There were apparently a
150. Id. at 444.
151. Id.
152. 94 N.M.263, 609 P.2d 345 (1980).
153. Id. at 265,609 P.2d at 347.
154. 92 N.M.116, 583 P.2d 480 (Ct.App. 1978).
155. "[Wlhen a investigation has focused on the accused he is entitled to the Miranda safeguards." Id. at 117,583 P.2d at 481.
156. 384U.S. at 461.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Gallagher, 430 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1970); Allen v. United
States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Rodney, 21 N.Y.2d 1,233 N.E.2d 255 (1967);
Kamisar, LaFave & Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 624 (5th ed. 1980).
158. 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
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number of officers at her home and some of them suspected a criminal homicide from the beginning. The court of appeals held that the
questioning in Montano fell into the category of "general onthe-scene questioning" which is not considered custodial under
Miranda."I Therefore, the court concluded that Miranda warnings
were not required prior to that questioning.
Defendant's second statement to the police was taken at the station house where she had gone at the request of the police at approximately 4:00 a.m. After that questioning she returned home. The
court, noting that all questioning done at the police station is not
custodial, 6 0 held that the defendant was not in custody or deprived
of her freedom of action in any significant way, and that it was
therefore not necessary for the police to give the defendant Miranda
warnings prior to the questioning at the station. The decision in
Montano is consistent with State v. Harge.'6' In Harge, the court
held that Mirandawarnings need not be given prior to questioning at
the station house under circumstances similar to those in
Montano.' 62 The court went on to note that "Miranda warnings
need not be given simply because questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect." 63 The police need not give the warnings to everyone whom
they question. Miranda warnings are required only where there is
such a restriction on a person's freedom as 6to render him "in custody and subject to a coercive environment.'"
The four cases appear to be inconsistent. Wheeler and Bramlett
can be distinguished from Harge and Montano however, on their
facts. In Wheeler and Bramlett, courts found that the defendants
were not free to leave, which was not the case in Harge and Montano. Nevertheless, the two lines of cases represent different
approaches to the question of when Mirandawarnings are required.
Harge and Montano represent perhaps the more orthodox view that
there must be a deprivation of freedom of action in a significant way
so as to create the coercive atmosphere necessary to trigger the fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
159. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477; State v. Montano, 95 N.M. at 237, 620 P.2d at
891.
160. See, Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
161. 94 N.M. 11,606 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1979).
162. 94 N.M. at 15, 606 P.2d at 1109. In Harge, the deputy testified that he could not
remember whether the defendant went to the police station of his own accord or at the request
of the police. The court stated that "at the time of the statement defendant was not taken into
"Id.
custody ..
163. Id.
164. Id.
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2. Waiver
In two cases decided during the Survey period the courts dealt with
the question of waiver of Mirandarights; i.e., the waiver of the right
to remain silent and the waiver of the right to counsel. In State v.
Showalter, 65 the defendant requested counsel, but his request was
ignored by the police who continued to interrogate him for about an
hour and a half. The trial court suppressed the statements and on the
state's appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the suppression. The
court observed that in Miranda,the Supreme Court had outlined the
procedure to be followed when an individual invokes his right to
counsel: "If [a suspect in custody] indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease. . . .If the individual states he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-

en t .

,166

Showalter presents the interesting question of what is the test for
waiver when a suspect has initially invoked his right to counsel, and
the state claims that he subsequently waived that right. The New
Mexico Supreme Court had decided in State v. Greene6 7 that a
defendant may, after an initial invocation of his right to counsel,
waive that right without having previously seen counsel. However,
under Greene the state must shoulder a heavy burden to prove that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel.
When Greene was decided, the Supreme Court of the United
States had not yet set down its rules on the question of subsequent
waiver after initial invocation of the right to counsel. In Michigan v.
Mosley' 6 the Supreme Court had expressly reserved that question,
noting that Miranda had distinguished between the procedural
safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for
an attorney.
This last term the United States Supreme Court faced the question
squarely and set out precise guidelines. In Edwardsv. Arizona, ,69 the
Supreme Court held
that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right
cannot be established by showing only that he responded to fur165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

94 N.M 663, 615 P.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1980).
94 N.M. at 664, 615 P.2d at 279; seealso, Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101 (1979).
91 N.M. 207, 572 P.2d 935 (1977).
423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
49 U.S.L.W. 4496 (May 19, 1981).
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ther police initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights. . . . An accused . . having expressed his
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the
police. 70

Showalter, being a clear case of police abuse of the rights pronounced in Miranda, is perfectly consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Edwards.
In State v. Trujillo, , , the state supreme court, for the first time
since Greene, faced the question of the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights subsequent to an initial invocation of the right to counsel.
In Trujillo, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights at the
station. He indicated that he did not wish to discuss any of the events
about the murder and he refused to waive his right to counsel. The
interrogating officer went on to ask a series of "background questions.'"I" During this questioning, the officer asked where the defendant had been on the night the victim was killed. The defendant's
reply was admitted in evidence although7 its
use was limited to im3
peachment of the defendant's testimony.'
In this pre-Edwards v. Arizona decision the state supreme court
inquired whether the defendant "knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights" 7 " and found such a waiver.
Under the precise guidelines elaborated in Edwards,,75 however, it
would seem that Trujillo's statement would now have to be sup170. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4498.
171. 95 N.M. 535, 624 P.2d 44 (1981). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see Note,
Custodial Interrogation in New Mexico: State v. Trujillo, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 577 (1982).
172. 95 N.M. at 540, 624 P.2d at 49.
173. Id. at 541, 624 P.2d at 50. As the Trujillo court noted, any error would have been
"harmless error" under the rule in Chapman v. California, 486 U.S. 18 (1967). Althogh the
evidence allegedly taken from Trujillo in violation of Miranda was used only for purposes of
impeachment, the court did not invoke the rule set out in Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 174 (1975)
and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In those cases, the United States Supreme Court
held that statements taken in violation of Mirandaare admissible for purposes of impeaching
the defendant's testimony at trial. An application of that rule would have enabled the New
Mexico Supreme Court to dispose of this issue in Trujillo with dispatch. It is possible that by its
failure to invoke the Harris/Haasexception to Miranda,and indeed by failing even to mention
either of the cases, the state supreme court signaled its disapproval of that exception to the rule
of exclusion for violations of Miranda.
Other states which have rejected Oregon v. Haas and Harris v. New York on state constitutional grounds include California, People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 360 (1976); Pennsylvania, Commonswealth v. Tuplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975);
and Hawaii, State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
174. 95 N.M. at 540, 624 P.2d at 49.
175. Edwards v. Arizona, 49 U.S.L.W. 4496 (May 19, 1981).
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pressed. Counsel was not made available to Trujillo before the
"background" interrogation was taken. The accused himself did not
initiate the further communication exchange or conversation with
the police. Rather it was the police who initiated the continuation of
the "background" questioning.I76 The New Mexico Supreme Court
may wish to reconsider both Greene and Trujillo in light of the
Edwardsdecision.
Further on the question of waiver, in State v. Bramlett,'7 the
court of appeals held that under the facts and circumstances of that
case, the defendant, who was highly intoxicated, could not have
"knowingly and voluntarily" waived his Mirandarights. Despite the
arresting officers' testimony that they believed Bramlett knew and
understood the Miranda warnings that had been read to him, the
court of appeals focused on the officer's description of his condition
at the time of the statements: "staggering, slurred speech, difficulty
in walking, strong alcoholic smell-and the intoxication test level of
.23.' ' 1 Moreover the court observed that the officers kept him in
jail "for his own protection" because they thought he was too intoxicated to be released.' 79 N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-2-22(a) (1978) permits
such detention of an intoxicated person. "Intoxicated person" is
defined as one "whose mental and physical functioning is so substantially impaired . . . that he has become . . . unable to care for
his own safety."' 8 0 Under these circumstances, the court of appeals
held that Bramlett was too intoxicated to knowingly and voluntarily
waive his Miranda rights. 'I8
Bramlett is, no doubt, an extreme case, particularly in light of the
police decision to detain the defendant in protective custody. The
state should, however, take note of the risk involved in taking statements from a highly intoxicated suspect.
B. Mental Competence To Give A Voluntary Statement
An issue related to but distinct from Miranda which arises when
the state seeks to admit statements by the defendant is that of the
176. The police practice of proceeding to ask "background questions" after a defendant has
invoked his right to remain silent or his right to counsel under Miranda is troublesome. Even
though a defendant like Trujillo might well have waived his rights under Miranda as to "background" information, it is unlikely that the defendant intended to waive those rights as to
questions so closely relating to the criminal incident as his whereabouts on the night of the
murder.
177. 94 N.M. 263, 609 P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1980).
178. 94 N.M. at 268, 609 P.2d at 350.
179. Id.
180. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-2-17(a) (1978).
181. 94 N.M.at 268, 609 P.2d at 350.
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voluntariness of the statement.' 82 Competency to give a statement is
an aspect of voluntariness.' 8 3 In State v. Ruiz,"" the court held that
the question of competency is not covered by the Uniform Jury Instructions.' 8 5 Therefore, where there is evidence to indicate that
defendant's mental competence to give a statement is in doubt, a
separate intruction on competence must be given. The court in Ruiz
recommended that the instruction use the language set forth in State
v. Manus: "[Tihe defendant must have had sufficient mental capacity at the time he made the statement, to be conscious of the physical
acts performed by him to retain them in his memory and to state
them with reasonable accuracy.

86

C. Comment On Defendant'sPost-ArrestSilence
Courts in New Mexico generally prohibit the state from commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence.' 87 This prohibition on comment is designed to protect another element of the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination: the right
to remain silent in the face of police interrogation. In State v.
Romero,'88 the court outlined the law on comment on post-arrest
silence as it stands in New Mexico today with its major exceptions.
In Romero, the defendant took the stand on his own behalf and
presented an alibi defense. On direct he was asked:
Q: If you committed these crimes would you plead guilty
today?
A: Yes, sir, I would.
On cross-examination, the following questioning occurred:
Q: When you were questioned by Detective Johnnie Brown on
the warrant for these eight different counts, why didn't you
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 101, 597 P.2d 280, 286 (1979).
94 N.M. 771, 617 P.2d 160 (Ct. App. 1980).
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 40.40 (N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978) provides:
Evidence has been admitted concerning a statement allegedly made by the defendant. Before you consider such statement for any purpose, you must determine
that the statement was given voluntarily. In determining whether a statement was
voluntarily given, you should consider if it was freely made and not induced by
promise or threat.
186. State v. Manus, 93 N.M. at 101, 597 P.2d at 286.
187. In State v. Lara, 88 N.M. 233, 539 P.2d 623 (Ct. App. 1975) the court held that if
defendant's silence lacks significant probative value, any reference to defendant's silence has
an intolerable prejudicial impact and is plain error requiring reversal even though raised for
first time on appeal.
188. 94 N.M. 300, 609 P.2d 1256 (Ct. App. 1980).
182.
183.
184.
185.
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explain to her what had really happened and what the mistakes were?
A: I had nothing to say for my own protection.

Q: At the preliminary hearing, did you take the stand and
testify to explain the mistakes?

Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I object.
The Court: Sustained.

Q: When is the first time you have told the story that you have
just told today?
A: Right now to you." 9

The court of appeals stated the rule that "it is clear that the prosecution may not use the defendant's silence at the time of his arrest to
impeach an exculpatory story which the defendant presents at trial.
The reason is that the silence is insoluably ambiguous.""'9 "Direct
comment" on post-arrest silence never has significant probative
value when used to impeach an exculpatory story presented at trial.
Such comment is plain error and reversal is required even though the
issue is raised for the first time on appeal.' 9' Two exceptions to the
plain error rule have been recognized by the New Mexico courts. In
State v. Baca' 92 the court distinguished between those comments
directly attributable to questioning of the defendant by the prosecutor and those comments incorporated within the testimony of a
witness and held that the latter would not be plain error, and therefore would be reviewable when a timely objection was made. The
second exception was set out by the United States Supreme Court in
Doyle v. Ohio. '9 In Doyle, the court stated that post-arrest silence
could be used by the state to impeach a defendant who claims to
have told the police an exculpatory story at the time of his arrest.
As the court in Romero noted, however,
post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict
the defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events
and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest.
In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to
impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge94 the defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest.'
In Romero, the court found that neither the Baca nor the Doyle ex189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.at 300-301, 609 P.2d at 1256-1257.
Id.at 301-302, 609 P.2d at 1257-1258.
Id.at 301,609 P.2d at 1257.
89 N.M. 204, 549 P.2d 282 (1976).
426 U.S. 610, 619, n.ll (1976).
94 N.M.at 302, 609 P.2d at 1257.
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ception to the plain error rule applied on the facts, and therefore the
prosecutor's comment constituted a reversible error.
State v. McGee'9 5 presents an example of a set of facts where the
court found as a matter of law that there had been no impermissible
comment by the prosecution on defendant's post-arrest silence. In
McGee, after questioning the defendant about his arrest and arraignment, the district attorney asked the general question, "did you tell
anyone about [your feeling that the police had the wrong man]?"' 9 6
After the defendant replied that he had told Kurt Lohbeck, a reporter, the prosecutor asked, "did you tell anyone else?"' 97 Because
the question was general and defendant's answer did not direct the
jury's attention to his silence upon arrest but rather to his calling a
local newsman, the court found that the question "did not amount
to a comment on defendant's silence at the time of his arrest."' 9 8
Therefore reversal was not required.
D. Comment On Defendant's FailureTo Testify
In two decisions handed down on succeeding days during the survey year, the state supreme court elaborated on the constitutional
prohibition against prosecutorial comment on defendant's failure to
testify. In Gonzales v. State"9 9 the state had argued that its comment
was if anything, "indirect comment" on the accused's failure to
testify at trial and therefore was not reversible error . 2 °0 The court
concluded that the prosecution's comment was reversible error. It
was "direct comment" on the defendant's failure to testify, whatever may have been the district attorney's intention in making the
comments, because "his choice of words do not exclude a reasonable
interpretation that2 he was making a direct comment on Gonzales'
failure to testify."° '
In State v. Ruffino,2 °2 the supreme court clarified two major
95 N.M.317, 621 P.2d 1129 (Ct. App. 1980).
Id.at 319, 621 P.2d at 1131.
Id.
Id.
94 N.M.495, 612 P.2d 1306 (1980).
The comment was:
And did you hear one word from the defense, one word of denial that he beat
him with this 2 x 4. Not one word of denial. . . . What was his justification for
doing to Byron what he did? He didn't tell you, the defense didn't tell you what
the reason was. He didn't give you any justification. He didn't deny that he hit
him with a 2 x 4 and he didn't tell you why.
Id. at 495, 612 P.2d at 1306.
201. Id.
202. 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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limitations on defense claims of reversible error on the grounds of
comment on defendant's failure to testify. First, the court made it
clear that such comment does not constitute "plain error."" 3 Therefore, where no objection is made by the defense at trial, the issue of
comment on defendant's failure to testify cannot be raised on appeal
for the first time. Further limiting the availability of this constitutional claim, the court repeated the rule that "[t1he prosecutor can
refer to the defendant's failure to testify if the door is opened by the
defense.
These cases may lead to anomolous results. Comment on postarrest silence, under Romero, is considered "plain error" under New
Mexico Rule of Evidence 103(d) and can be raised for the first time
on appeal.20 5 On the other hand, comment on the defendant's failure
to testify at trial, is not considered plain error and must be preserved
by timely objection at trial in order to be raised on appeal.
The rights affected by comment on post-arrest silence and failure
to take the stand are identical. Both types of comment violate the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In State v.
Marquez"6 the court of appeals cited several definitions of "plain
error": "grave errors which affect substantial rights of the accused;" "errors that result in a clear miscarriage of justice;" errors
that "are obvious or . . . otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. ' 20 7 If a defendant's right to no comment on post-arrest silence is "substantial,"
the right to no comment on failure to testify must be as well. If it is a
"clear miscarriage of justice" for the prosecutor to comment on
post-arrest silence, the state's comment on the even more basic right
to refuse to take the stand must be an even more grievous error. Certainly prosecutorial comment on defendant's failure to testify is at
least as obvious an error as is comment on post-arrest silence.
III. GRAND JURY
The 1978 amendments to the grand jury statutes have substantially changed grand jury practices in New Mexico.2" 8 During the
203. Id. at 503, 612 P.2d 1314 (1980).
204. Id.
205. See also, State v. Lara, 88 N.M. 233, 539 P.2d 623 (Ct. App. 1975).
206. 87 N.M. 57, 529 P.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273
(1974).
207. Id. at 61, 529 P.2d at 287, quoting United States v. Campbell, 419 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th
Cir. 1969).
208. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§31-6-1 to -14 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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Survey period, the New Mexico courts decided a number of cases
which interpreted that statutory scheme and enforced its provisions.
A. Notice Requirement
The court in Rogers v. State" 9 thoroughly outlined the requirements of notice to the target witness set out in N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-6-11(B) (1978), as well as the procedures for challenging adequacy of notice. After Rogers the rules for compliance with the target notice requirement and for challenges to be raised for noncompliance are quite clear.
Under Rogers, any challenge to the adequacy of notice to the
target witness under Section 31-6-11 (B) must be raised by the defendant before trial.2 10 Once the issue is raised by the defense, the prosecution then has the burden of persuading the trial court that the
notice was adequate. Notice is mandatory and it is the responsibility
of the district attorney attending the grand jury to provide that
notice absent the existence of one of the statutory exceptions. 2"'
The court in Rogers provided specific instructions regarding the
timing of notice to the target witness. Notice must be received "in
sufficient time to exercise the right to testify." 2 ' The 36-hour notice
required for all subpoenaed witnesses under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-612(A) (1978) was interpreted by the court to be required for all target
witnesses, even if not subpoenaed, unless a judge specifically
approves a shorter period."1 3
The opinion in Rogers further elaborated on the test for proper
notice in terms of the content of the notice itself. The language of the
notice must be such that a nonlawyer would reasonably understand
that he was a target of a grand jury investigation.2 4
Any method for sending notice is acceptable, whether written or
oral, so long as it complies with the statutory intent that the target be
given an opportunity to testify, and so long as the prosecutor exer209. 94 N.M. 218, 608 P.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1980).
210. The court also noted that in Rogers the defendant "desired to testify and would have if
given an opportunity to do so." The court does not say that this is an essential element of a
claim of inadequate notice, but a prudent defense attorney would want to plead and prove the
foregoing in a motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to provide notice to the target
witness. Id. at 222, 608 P.2d at 534.
211. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-6-11 (B) (Cum. Supp. 1981) states: "The target shall be notified
of his target status and be given an opportunity to testify, if he desires to do so, unless the prosecutor determines that notification may result in flight, endanger other persons, obstruct
justice, or the prosecutor is unable with reasonable diligence to notify said person." (emphasis
added).
212. 94 N.M. at 221,608 P.2d at 533.
213. Id.
214. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

cises reasonable diligence in giving notice. Specifically, though
notice to counsel may be sufficient, it is not sufficient to send notice
to the public defender if, as in the Rogers case, the district attorney
should have known that the defendant had private attorneys. 25
If the district attorney wishes to send notice to an incarcerated
defendant at the jail, there will be no presumption of delivery without evidence of the jail's mail system. In any event, there will be no
presumption of timely delivery. Thus the careful district attorney
will establish some sort of certification of affidavit system indicating
not only delivery but the specific time of delivery.
B. Evidence
An interesting dichotomy has arisen in New Mexico law on the
question of the type of evidence to be presented before the grand
jury. In Maldonado v. State,2" ' the state supreme court held that
N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-6-11(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980), which requires
that the grand jury receive only evidence which is admissible at trial,
is "directory" only, and is not subject to enforcement by the courts.
The court further held that the introduction of inadmissible evidence
before the grand jury does not violate due process unless the trial
itself is rendered unfair. This holding reaffirms the court's longstanding position." 7
Shortly before Maldonado was decided, the court of appeals in
State v. Herrera,II8 affirmed the trial court's dismissal of an indictment on the ground that the prosecutor had failed to present exculpatory evidence known to him. The court in Herrerafound that the
prosecutor's omission constituted a denial of due process to the
defendant.
It is difficult to understand how the prosecutorial error before the
grand jury in Herreracould constitute a denial of due process under
the Maldonado test, which requires that the trial itself be rendered
unfair. Certainly the omission of exculpatory evidence at the grand
jury can be remedied by the trial court's admission of such evidence
at trial, just as hearsay evidence can be excluded at trial. That action
by the trial court would preclude any transfer of the unfairness to the
trial.
It was suggested that Maldonado may have overruled Herrerasub
215. Id. at 221-222, 608 P.2d at 533-534.
216. 93 N.M. 670, 604 P.2d 363 (1979). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see Note,
Criminal Procedure-Grand Jury-Inadmissible Evidence-Due Process: Maldonado v.
State, 11 N.M. L. Rev. 451 (1981).
217. The New Mexico courts have long been considered to be without the power to review
the sufficiency, legality, or competency of the evidence presented to the grand jury. See State v.
Chance, 29 N.M. 34, 221 P. 183 (1923).
218. 93 N.M. 442, 601 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1979).
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silentio.I 9 This view was expressly rejected by the court of appeals in
State v. Lampman,2 2 0 decided during the Survey year. In Lampman,
the court of appeals found a denial of due process where a prosecutor had refused to allow a grand jury witness to testify to an inconsistent statement by the officer at the scene of the accident. The
court found that the prosecutor had knowingly withheld exculpatory
evidence from the grand jury. The court, therefore, held that the
defendant had been denied due process. It rejected the state's
reliance on Maldonado and stated: "Maldonado did not overrule
Herrera. . 2
In State v. Sanchez,2 2 the court cited to N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-622 4
and again
1 (B) (Cum. Supp. 1980),223 relied on State v. Herrera,
he
because
Sanchez
the
prosecutor,
found a denial of due process. In
the
to
provide
thought the exculpatory evidence was untrue, refused
jury with the confession of a co-defendant which contained exculpatory statements concerning the defendant. The court held that the
prosecutor's "belief that Lucero was lying was not determinative." 2 25 The sole question was whether the evidence "tended to
negate guilt." If so, its omission required dismissal of the indictment.226
It is difficult to square the due process analysis in the Herrera,
Lampman, Gonzales, and Sanchez line of cases with the due process
analysis pronounced by the state supreme court in Maldonado. It is
unclear how the failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury in and of itself taints the fairness of the trial. It is even less clear
why an indictment should be dismissed after a trial in which the
defendant was convicted, presumably in the face of the exculpatory
evidence. If the exculpatory evidence did not prevent a conviction
under beyond a reasonable doubt standards,22 7 it is illogical to
reverse a conviction and order the dismissal of an indictment
because that same evidence was not presented to the grand jury
operating under a probable cause standard. 8
The Maldonado rule may not justify the result in Herrera,Lamp219. Hartz, Criminal Law and Procedure, 11 N.M. L. Rev. 85 (1981).
220. 95 N.M. 279, 620 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App. 1980) [Editor's note: Lampman, Herrera, and
other exculpatory evidence/grand jury cases were overruled in Buzbee v. Donnelly, 634 P.2d
(1981)].
221. 95 N.M. at 280, 620 P.2d at 1305.
222. 95 N.M. 27, 618 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1980).
223. 95 N.M. at 28, 618 P.2d at 372.
224. 93 N.M. 442, 601 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1979).
225. 95 N.M. at 28, 618 P.2d at 372.
226. Id.
227. The reasonable doubt standard is required in criminal cases as a matter of due process.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
228. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-6-10 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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man, and Sanchez. Other policy considerations, however, may support those results. It is the function of the grand juries to find
"probable cause" to hold the defendant for trial. In other procedures where probable cause is to be determined, hearsay is admissible.2 29 There is no reason, then, why such evidence should not be
admissible before the grand jury or why its introduction before the
grand jury should constitute a denial of due process.
On the other hand, the prosecutor has an obligation to conduct the
grand jury in a fair and impartial manner, particularly as the grand
jury proceeding is usually conducted ex parte. The introduction of
exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor would be a way of ensuring such fairness.
IV. HABITUAL OFFENDERS
A. Double Jeopardy
A person convicted of a non-capital felony in New Mexico who
has one or more prior felony convictions is subject to the New Mexico Habitual Offender Act. 23 The act mandates from one to eight
years' enhancement of sentence without possibility of suspension or
deferral. This provision has led to much litigation and has been
attacked on a double jeopardy theory.' In four cases decided last
year232 the New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed the position set
out in State v. Linam,25 5 that because a habitual offender proceeding
only involves sentencing and not trial of any crime, double jeopardy
does not attach in such a proceeding. Indeed, in State v. Garcia23"
and State v. Archibeque,"I the court concluded that double jeopardy did not apply even where the habitual offender proceeding did
not commence until a substantial time after the defendants were convicted and sentenced on the underlying offense and had begun serving that sentence. 36 Thus, the position on the double jeopardy im229. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964);
N.M. R. Evid. 804(b) and notes thereto.
230. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-17 (1978). The enhancement varies depending on the number
of prior convictions. One prior offense leads to a one-year enhancement; two priors, four
years; and three or more priors, eight years.
231. See annotations to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-17 (1978).
232. State v. Archibeque, 95 N.M. 411,622 P.2d 1031 (1981); State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. 246,
620 P.2d 1271 (1980); State v. James, 94 N.M. 604, 614 P.2d 16 (1980); and State v. Valenzuela, 94 N.M. 340, 610 P.2d 744 (1980).
233. 93 N.M. 307, 600 P.2d 253 (1979).
234. 95 N.M. 246, 620 P.2d 1271 (1980).
235. 95 N.M. 411,622 P.2d 1031 (1980).
236. State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. at 251, 620 P.2d at 1276; State v. Archibeque, 95 N.M. at 411,
622 P.2d at 1031. But see Bullington v. Missouri, 49 U.S.L.W. 4481 (May 4, 1981) where the
Supreme Court held that the death penalty cannot be imposed at a second sentencing pro-
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plications of habitual offender proceedings is now firmly established
in New Mexico.2 37
B. Burdens of Proof
The court in State v. Garcia went beyond the double jeopardy
question to explain the shifting burdens of proof in challenges to the
validity of prior convictions leading to habitual offender proceedings.
The state has the burden of proof in making a prima facie case
that a defendant has been convicted of a prior felony. If the
defendant raises the defense that the prior convictions are invalid, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence
demonstrating their invalidity. If no evidence is produced,
• . . then this defense is not a matter to be decided. But if such

evidence had been produced, then the state would have had the
burden of persuasion as to the validity of the prior convictions.
. . . The absence of a record of a guilty plea proceeding does

not establish the invalidity of the guilty plea but only that the
transcript of that proceeding is unavailable.238
In Garciaand in State v. James, the court suggested two bases on
which a defendant might successfully challenge the validity of a
ceeding after retrial of defendant where the jury in the first sentencing hearing had fixed the
penalty at life, the only alternative to capital punishment.
Bullington is distinguishable in at least one respect from these New Mexico decisions. In the
New Mexico cases, defendants have argued that the prior jeopardy which precluded a defined
habitual offender hearing attached at the trial itself. State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. at 248, 620 P.2d
at 1273; State v. Archibeque, 95 N.M. at 411, 622 P.2d at 1031. On the other hand, Bullington's claim was that jeopardy attached after the first sentencing hearing vis-a-vis any record of
such proceeding. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4483.
The United States Supreme Court's decision emphasizes, however, the trial-like process in
Missouri's capital-sentencing proceeding. That process is similar to trial because of the requirement that the state prove its case for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
limit of two choices (similar to the guilty/not guilty choice presented to juries in criminal trials)
available to the Missouri jury. Bullington v. Missouri, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4483. In several respects
these characteristics are shared by our habitual offender proceedings which require a "minitrial" where the state must prove the prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover,
the jury is similarly limited to one of two decisions-finding the prior offense or not.
Thus, Bullington does not threaten the validity of the foregoing New Mexico cases, but does
indicate the potentially significant limitation to our court's position that double jeopardy does
not apply to habitual offender proceedings. Bullington suggests that the merits of an argument
that a prior habitual offender hearing favorable to defendant would preclude a subsequent
proceeding where both sought to enhance the penalty for the same basic conviction.
237. Moreover, New Mexico's rule derives some support from United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), in which the United States Supreme Court found no double
jeopardy problem in a state's appeal solely from the sentence imposed upon the defendant.
238. State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. at 248, 620 P.2d at 1273, quoting rulings from State v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 730, 594 P.2d 1186 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. quashed, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286
(1979).
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prior conviction.23 9 In Garcia, the defendant claimed that his prior
convictions arose from guilty pleas which were not intelligently or
voluntarily made. The supreme court indicated in Garcia that such a
claim, if proven, would invalidate a prior conviction for habitual
offender purposes.2"' In James, the defendant claimed that his prior
conviction was invalid because it had been obtained in part through
the admission of evidence which was constitutionally inadmissible.
Although the court rejected the defendant's claim because it had
previously decided the question of the conviction,2 ' the court
seemed to indicate it would otherwise consider
such a claim of con24 2
stitutional invalidity of a prior conviction.
C. Delay-Due Process
In State v. Hirsch,24 3 the defendant invoked a constitutional claim
of denial of due process to challenge a five-month delay in filing a
supplemental information seeking to enhance his sentence as a habitual offender. 24 The defendant asserted a denial of due process

because the pendency of the habitual offender proceeding had
rendered his first parole hearing meaningless. The pendency of the
habitual offender proceeding also caused the postponement of a
second parole hearing until a date actually later than that which
would have been set if he had been initially sentenced as a habitual
offender. The court rejected the due process contention. In doing so,
the court contrasted the defendant's case to due process claims arising from pretrial delay. The court noted that in pre-trial delay cases
the constitutional malady arises from prejudice to the defendant's
ability to get a fair trial. No such claim was made in the instant case.
Rather the alleged prejudice was to defendant's right within the
parole process. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy for
the defendant was within that parole process.24 5
The court's position makes a great deal of sense. The appropriate
remedy for the defendant in light of his claimed prejudice would be
to advance the parole hearing date to that which would have applied
239. State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. 246, 620 P.2d 1271 (1980); State v. James, 94 N.M. 604, 614
P.2d 16 (1980).
240. 95 N.M. at 251, 620 P.2d at 1275: "If a guilty plea is induced by promises by the State,
the bargain must be enforced or some other appropriate relief should be granted."
241. State v. James (1), 76 N.M. 376, 415 P.2d 350 (1966). Note that neither the defendant
in James nor the defendant in Garcia was successful in his challenge.
242. State v. James, 94 N.M. at 605, 614 P.2d at 17.
243. 95 N.M. 169, 619 P.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1980).
244. Defendant was convicted on the underlying offense on May 2, 1979, and sentenced on
May 29, 1979. The supplemental information was filed October 4, 1979. Id.
245. 95 N.M. at 170, 619 P.2d at 846.
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if his habitual offender conviction had come down in May 1979, at
the time of his original conviction. A due process challenge to the
habitual offender proceeding should only arise where delay in bringing the proceeding results in prejudice6 to defendant's ability to
defend himself in that very proceeding.
D. Time of Commission
In State v. Linam, 2" the state supreme court held that: "the use of
the words 'upon conviction of such second felony' or 'third felony'
as used in the [Habitual Offender Act] must be held to mean felonies
committed subsequent to the dates of the convictions relied on to
effect an increase of the penalty." 2" 8 This is because of the deterrent
purpose of the Habitual Offender Act-"the increased penalty is
held in terrorem over the criminal for the purpose of effecting his
reformation and preventing further and subsequent offenses by
him." 2I 9 In State v. Valenzuela,2 5 ° and State v. Wise,25 ' the supreme
court reaffirmed its holding in Linam.
Linam focused on the sequence of conviction and commission between the underlying offense and one or more prior offenses. Wise,
on the other hand, held that the trial court's instructions were erroneous because, while the instructions "required the jury to consider the consecutive order of convictions [of nine different alleged
prior offenses], 25 2 [t]he jury [was] not charged with considering
whether each subsequent crime was committed after the previous
conviction." 2"
Thus, Wise indicates that where a defendant is charged under the
Act with more than one prior offense, the conviction of each prior
offense must precede the commission of each subsequent prior
offense. This rule is unnecessarily burdensome. The deterrent purpose of the Habitual Offender Act is sufficiently well served by the
Linam requirement that commission of the underlying offense need
246. U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
See also, State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257 (1971); State v. Adams, 80 N.M. 426, 457
P.2d 223 (1969).
247. 93 N.M. 307, 600 P.2d 253 (1979).
248. Id. at 309, 600 P.2d at 255.
249. Id.
250. 94 N.M. 340, 610 P.2d 744 (1980).
251. 95 N.M. 265, 620 P.2d 1290 (1981).
252. The dates of convictions stated in each count were: Count 1, June, 1943; Count 2,
August 28, 1944; Count 3, February 3, 1950; Count 4, February 3, 1950; Count 5, June 11,
1953; Count 6, May 6, 1963; Count 7, May 6, 1963; Count 8, February 7, 1973; Count 9, May
18, 1977.
253. State v. Wise, 95 N.M. at 266, 620 P.2d at 1291.
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follow conviction of any prior offense used for enhancement. Wise,
thus, is an unnecessary imposition on the prosecution.
E. PriorFederalConvictions as Basis
A different question regarding the Habitual Offender Act arose in
two cases, State v. James,25 ' and State v. Montoya.2"' Both cases involved prior federal convictions. In both cases, the state supreme
court discussed the circumstances under which a non-New Mexico
felony conviction constitutes a felony under the laws. Each case applied a standard different from that enunciated in a previous New
Mexico decision. 56
In James, the prior convictions were for bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery. The court held that because the record in the prior conviction showed that the trial court had found
"appellant had entered the bank with the intent to commit larceny," 2I' his presence was unauthorized and therefore met the requisite elements of New Mexico's burglary statute.2 58
In Montoya, the prior federal conviction was for illegal purchase
of heroin. The court observed that the dictionary definition of the
word "purchase" necessarily includes the actual or constructive
"possession" of heroin, and actual or constructive possession of
heroin is a felony under the laws of New Mexico. 259 The court held
that the Habitual Offender Act was therefore properly applied.
In State v. Garduno,2 60 the court had held that a prior federal drug
conviction could be used to increase defendant's penalty for his
subsequent state conviction because "the federal offense was substantially the same as the state offense." ' 26' After James and Montoya, the question of whether a non-New Mexico felony conviction
may be used to enhance the penalty under the Habitual Offender Act
may be decided by applying any of three standards. The first standard is that enunciated in Garduno: where the statutory elements of
the two offenses are identical, the prior federal conviction may
be used to enhance the penalty. The second standard is that of Montoya: where the dictionary definition of the elements of the federal
254. 94 N.M. 604,614 P.2d 16 (1980).
255. 94 N.M. 704, 616 P.2d 417 (1980).
256. State v. Garduno, 93 N.M. 335, 600 P.2d 281 (1979).
257. 94 N.M. at 605, 614 P.2d at 17.
258. The burglary statute reads: "Burglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any ...
dwelling or other structure, .... with the intent to commit any felony or theft therein." N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 30-16-3 (1978).
259. State v. Montoya, 94 N.M. at 706, 616 P.2d at -4.19.
260. 93 N.M. 335, 600 P.2d 281 (1979).
261. Id. at 336,600 P.2d at 282.
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offense necessarily include those of a state offense, the federal
offense can be used as a prior offense for purposes of the Habitual
Offender Act. Finally, from James, there is yet another standard:
where the evidence presented on a not necessarily identical element
of one offense would prove an element of another, the federal conviction can be used to invoke the Habitual Offender Act.
F. Discretion
In State v. Russell,2 6 the court of appeals held that the Habitual
Offender Act only precludes suspension or deferment of the oneyear sentence imposed by that section and does not preclude deferment or suspension of the basic sentence.2 "3 Thus even in a habitual
offender case the trial court maintains its discretion to suspend or to
defer the basic sentence imposed on the underlying offense.
V. TRIAL BY JURY
In several cases decided during the Survey year, the appellate
courts of New Mexico dealt with a variety of questions involving the
jury trial process. The courts considered questions involving
challenges, instructions, communication with jurors, and the right to
a jury trial on appeal.
A. Jury Selection
In three cases the courts considered the process of jury selection.
In State v. Crespin,1" the defendant claimed constitutional error
because the state had exercised a peremptory challenge against the
only black member of the jury venire. The court of appeals found
there was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination in the prosecution's exercise of its peremptory. The court also recognized a
rebuttable presumption that peremptory challenges are exercised for
proper (i.e., non-racial) reasons. The court, however, adopted a
more liberal standard of proof to rebut that presumption than had
been adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Swain v.
2 6
Alabama. 1
262. 94 N.M. 544, 612 P.2d 1355 (Ct. App. 1980).
263. Id. at 545, 612 P.2d at 1356. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-17(B) (1978) states that the basic
sentence of a habitual offender "shall be increased by one year, and the sentence imposed by
this subsection shall not be suspended or deferred." (emphasis supplied by the court.)
264. 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980).
265. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, the court held that "[tihe presumption is not overcome
. . . by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they
were removed because they were Negroes." Id. at 222.
In Swain the Supreme Court stated:
[l]t is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a par-
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Essentially Swain requires that the defendant base his claim of
racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges on a
factual base which is broader than that presented by his case
alone.266 The Crespin court observed that more recent cases and
scholarly commentary suggested that the Swain test may be too
limited. The court concluded that "certain fact situations may arise
where the defendant can overcome the presumption based entirely
upon the facts of his own case. '"267 In sum, the New Mexico court
held that improper use of peremptory challenges can be shown in
two ways: 1) "by presenting facts beyond the instant case" or 2)
"where the absolute number of challenges in the one case raises the
inference of systematic acts by the prosecutor." 26
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Crespin case is that the
court of appeals based its adoption of the more liberal test not upon
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution,

69

but

solely upon Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.270
Thus, for the first time, a New Mexico appellate court has expressly
held that a provision of the New Mexico Constitution provides a
separate and greater protection for the people of New Mexico than
ticular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved and
the particular crime charged. But when the prosecutor in a county, in case after
case, whatever the circumstances . . . is responsible for the removal of Negroes
who have been selected as qualified jurors and who have survived challenges for
cause . . it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are
being perverted.
380 U.S. at 223-24.
266. See also United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977); Morgan v. United
States, 564 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1977).
267. 94 N.M. at 487, 612 P.2d at 717. The court of appeals was concerned that the limited
rule of Swain "would provide no protection to the first defendant who suffers such discrimination but, because he is the first, he cannot show enough 'instances' to establish a pattern of
prosecutorial abuse." The court also felt that "such a limited rule provides a right that seldom,
if ever, results in a remedy . . . because of an inability to present the information necessary to
support the claim. In the normal case, counsel would have no prior notice that the issue might
become relevant." Id.
268. Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718. The court also helpfully set out examples of two cases in
which courts of other jurisdictions have upheld claims of racial discrimination in the exercise
of peremptory challenges under the second test adopted in Crespin; see People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) (where the prosecutor peremptorily
challenged at least seven black jurors); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979)
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1980) (where the prosecutor peremptorily challenged twelve of thirteen qualified black jurors).
269. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
270. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... [to a] speedy public
trial by an impartial jury.
...
N.M. Const. art. 2 § 14.
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an identically worded provision of the United States Constitution.", 1
A separate question regarding jury selection arose in State v. Martinez.272 The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his
challenge of two jurors for cause. The state supreme court rejected
his claim, noting that the trial court has a great deal of discretion in
accepting challenges to jurors for cause. The court announced three
prerequisites for a valid challenge to that discretion: 1) the defendant
must show manifest error or clear abuse of discretion in the trial
court's failure to dismiss the jurors; 2) the defendant must allege
that he would have used the peremptories used on the jurors challenged for cause to excuse an equal number of other jurors; and 3)
the defendant must allege that the impartiality of the jury panel was
affected by leaving the challenged jurors on the panel. If the last
showing is not made, the court indicated that any error would be
harmless. 273
2 7 the defendant claimed the denial
Finally, in State v. Rodriguez,"
of a fair trial because a juror did not disclose information that might
bear on his ability to make a fair and impartial decision.27 5 The court
rejected the defendant's claim, and set out a two-pronged showing to
be required of defendants who assert such a claim. First, the defen271. 94 N.M. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718. Other state courts have similarly interpreted their
state constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1975); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974); State v. Kaluna, 55
Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). The New Mexico Supreme Court may have signaled a more expansive view of Miranda and of the exclusionary rule in State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535, 624
P.2d 44 (1981). There is some jurisprudence in New Mexico to support the Crespin court's
overt adoption of the independent state constitutional ground. In State v. Wilson, 92 N.M. 54,
582 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1978), the court of appeals held that New Mexico's Implied Consent
Statute provided greater protection than the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. In State v. Slayton, 90 N.M. 447, 564 P.2d 1329 (Ct. App. 1977) the court of appeals invoked New Mexico's due process clause and ignored the federal constitutional provision. In
State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966) the state supreme court observed that having found an arrest valid under the fourth amendment, it was bound to test the validity of the
arrest under New Mexico constitutional standards. But State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 604, 556 P.2d
1142 (1977) is to the contrary. There the court found the double jeopardy clause in New Mexico's constitution identical to that in the federal constitution, and concluded that the clauses
should be interpreted identically. As noted in the text accompanying notes 96-108 supra, the
supreme court in State v. Ruffino has provided the additional protection of a warrant requirement before items found in the course of an inventory search may be seized. By no means does
the court in Ruffino suggest an independent state constitutional ground for such added protection.
272. 95 N.M. 445, 623 P.2d 565 (1981).
273. Id. at 450, 623 P.2d at 570.
274. 94 N.M. 801,617 P.2d 1316 (1980).
275. The defendant claimed that a juror had not fully disclosed the fact that he knew a
relative of a victim. 94 N.M. at 801,617 P.2d at 1316.
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dant must show that the juror knew more than he actually disclosed.
Second, the defendant must show that the juror failed properly to
perform his duties to the prejudice of the defendant.2 76
B. Communications with Jurors
During the Survey year, the New Mexico courts decided two cases
involving external communications with jurors during trial. In the
first case, State v. Perez,2" the supreme court upheld the trial court's
refusal to poll the jury members after they had been discharged concerning their knowledge and opinion of newspaper articles regarding
the case. The court found no abuse of discretion where the defendant had made no showing that any juror had read the article, and
the request to poll the jury was not made until after the jurors were
discharged. The article was not part of the record on appeal. The
supreme court, therefore, was unable to review it independently.
State v. Perea,2" involved a classic case of improper communication with and among jurors. In Perea, a newspaper with a headline
and lengthy pro-prosecution article about the case was found in the
jury room while the jury was absent. Thereafter, the bailiff told
the jury: 1) that a defense attorney had "elatedly commented that
defendant had won his case because of the jury's exposure to the
newspaper;" and 2) he didn't know what would happen to him for
allowing the newspaper into the jury room. The juror who brought
the newspaper into the room admitted her mistake, apologized, and
indicated that she hoped it would "not cause a mistrial or undue
acquittal or whatever it's called." 2 9 That same juror had stated to
other jurors that she did not want an acquittal.
The jurors, when questioned by the judge, asserted their continued impartiality. The court of appeals reversed the defendant's
conviction, however, because the communications had thoroughly
contaminated the atmosphere of the jury. The deliberations of the
jury, the court stated, should be totally free of such "outside
mischiefs.""2 8
In State v. Rickerson,28 the court of appeals ruled once again on
an allegation of a "shotgun instruction." In Rickerson, the court
held that trial court inquiry into the numerical division of the jury,
though not to be encouraged, is not in and of itself, reversible error.
276. State v. Rodriguez, 94 N.M. at 802, 617 P.2d at 1317. It was this second element of the
test that was not met in Rodriguez.
277. 95 N.M. 262, 620 P.2d 1287 (1980).
278. 95 N.M. 777, 626 P.2d 851 (Ct. App. 1981).
279. 95 N.M. at 779, 626 P.2d at 853.
280. 95 N.M. at 780, 626 P.2d at 852.
281. 95 N.M. 666, 625 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1981).
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Such inquiry will only result in reversal where it is shown to have had
a coercive effect on the jury.
The court expanded on the meaning of "coercive effect" with
illustrations of the types of factors to be considered in determining
the presence of coercion:
a) whether any additional instruction or instructions, especially
a shotgun instruction were given; b) whether the court failed to
caution a jury not to surrender honest convictions, thus pressuring holdout jurors to conform; and c) whether the court established time limits on further deliberations with a threat of a
mistrial."'
C. Right to Jury Trialon Appeal
In State v. Haar,8 ' the court of appeals found no right to a jury
trial on appeal de novo from magistrate court. The court cited
Baldwin v. New York 2" 4 for the proposition that where sentence cannot be enhanced no jury trial is required. 8 ' The court noted that the
statutory provision governing appeals from magistrate court, is
silent as to the right of the court to enhance the penalty and that the
history of the statute indicates that the legislature intended that there
be no such right.28 " The court concluded that there was no constitutional requirement of the trial by jury on appeal de novo from
magistrate court.28 The court found that because the language of
the statute governing appeals from municipal court, does expressly
provide for the imposition of "the same, a greater, or a lesser penalty as that imposed in the municipal court," a right to trial by jury
is constitutionally required on appeals from municipal court.'
A 1981 amendment to N.M. Stat. Ann. §35-13-2 added language
indicating that, on affirmance of a magistrate court judgment, "the
district court shall enter judgment imposing the same, a greater or a
lesser penalty as that imposed in the magistrate court. .. .
Thus Haar is no longer good law with regard to appeals from
282. Id. at 667, 625 P.2d at 1184.
283. 94 N.M. 539, 612 P.2d 1350 (Ct. App. 1980).
284. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
285. A jury trial, however, is otherwise required where more than a six-month's imprisonment is authorized. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
286. 94 N.M. at 541, 612 P.2d at 1352.
287. State v. Haar, 94 N.M. at 540, 612 P.2d at 1351.
288. It should be noted that the language of the statute regarding appeals from metropolitan
court is the same as that of the magistrate court statute interpreted in Haar. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§34-8A-6 (1979). It would seem therefore, that on appeals de novo from metropolitan court
there is also no right to enhance the penalty, and consequently no right to trial by jury.
289. N.M. Stat. Ann. §35-13-2 (Supp. 1981).
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magistrate court. The provision on appeals from metropolitan
court, however, remains unchanged. 90
VI. STATE'S RIGHT TO APPEAL

In State v. Santillanes,2 ' the court of appeals held that the state
has the right to appeal the decision of the trial court, on enhancement. The trial court sustained a motion to strike enhancement of
sentence with prejudice. The trial court had sentenced petitioner and
he had begun to serve his sentence. In allowing the appeal, the court
of appeals interpreted the New Mexico Constitution 9 2 and a New
Mexico statute. 9 3
The defendant had argued that the state's right of appeal was
limited to those situations expressly set out in N.M. Stat. Ann.
§39-3-3(B). The court of appeals conceded that the predecessors
of the present statute provided that the state should only be allowed
an appeal under the circumstances indicated in the statute. However, the word "only" has been omitted in recent enactments of
§ 39-3-3(B).
Rejecting dictum to the contrary in State v. Gunzelman,2 94 the
court noted that the New Mexico constitutional provision grants an
"absolute right to one appeal" to any aggrieved party.29 5 Section
39-3-3(B) "merely recognizes the state's constitutional right to
appeal and identifies circumstances permitting ordinary and interlocutory appeals." 2'96 An appeal was thus permitted in Santillanes

and the enhancement was struck.
290. See note 288 supra.
291. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 163 (Feb. 5, 1981), rev'don other grounds, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull.
712, 632 P.2d 354 (1981).
292. N.M. Const. art. 6, §2:
Appeals from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or
life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court. In all other
cases, criminal and civil, the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction
as may be provided by law; provided that an aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal. (emphasis added).
293. N.M. Stat. Ann. §39-3-3(B) (1978) provides:
In any criminal proceeding in district court an appeal may be taken by the state
(1)within thirty days from a decision, judgment or order dismissing a complaint, indictment or information as to any one or more counts; (2) within ten
days from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding
evidence or requiring the return of seized property. ...
294. 85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55 (1973).
295. See note 292 supra. As the court of appeals observed, the state is obviously a party to
every criminal proceeding, and is aggrieved when it claims a disposition against it by the court
was contrary to law. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 165.
296. Id. at 165. The United States Supreme Court for the first time made clear that the
government may in certain instances appeal on the issue of sentence without violating the
double jeopardy clause. In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1981) the court by a
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VII. PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF A RAPE VICTIM

In two decisions during the Survey year, the court of appeals defined the extent of the trial court's discretion to order psychiatric
examinations of rape victims. In State v. Romero,297 the court of
appeals upheld the refusal to order such an examination because it
"would have unnecessarily invaded the victim's right to privacy." 29 8
The court held that
while court-ordered psychiatric examination of the prosecuting
witness in a sex crime may occasionally be proper, such an order
may not issue unless it is shown that the probative value of the
evidence reasonably likely to be obtained from the examination
outweighs the prejudicial effect of such evidence and the prosecutrix' right of privacy. 99

In Romero the court found that the probative value of the evidence
in question was small because the victim's psychological condition
was shown by other evidence and there was no attempt by the state
to present any further evidence in rebuttal. Therefore refusal of the
order was proper.30 0
In State v. Garcia,"0 ' the court of appeals found an example of a
proper court-ordered psychiatric examination of the rape victim. In
Garcia, defendant was convicted of four counts of criminal sexual
five-four decision, upheld a provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 that gives
the government the right to appeal from sentence imposed on a "dangerous special offender."
The Court reasoned that sentencing does not possess the qualities of constitutional finality that
attach to acquittal. Nor, in the Court's view, do the considerations underlying the double
jeopardy clause, i.e. prevention of the anxiety, embarrassment, and expense to which the
government subjects a defendant when it repeatedly tries to convict, have any real significance
during appeal of sentence.
297. 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980).
298. Id. at 26, 606 P.2d at 1120.
299. Id. at 27, 606 P.2dat 1121.
300. Id. The court relied on its interpretation of several regulatory and statutory provisions.
Rule 29 of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure gives a defendant the right of access
to material which has a bearing on the offense charged or a defense thereto "unless otherwise
limited by order of the court." Rule 31 of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that the court can "make any orderwhich justice requires to protect a party or person
" Such an order may infrom annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden ....
dicate that a deposition may not be taken. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-16 (1978) "severely limits the
opportunity of a defendant charged with sexual offenses to impeach the prosecutrix testimony
by presenting evidence as to her prior sexual behavior." The Romero court stated that the
enactment of § 30-9-16 demonstrates that it is "strong public policy in this state to prevent unwarranted intrusions into the private affairs of the victims of sex crimes." 94 N.M. at 27, 606
P.2d at 1121. Psychiatric examination such as that requested in Romero presents a profoundly
intrusive probing of the victim's psyche insofar as it examines the victim's past sexual
behavior. The court concluded that such an examination was therefore within the terms of
§ 30-9-16.
301. 94 N.M. 583, 613 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1980).
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penetration in the second degree. 302 Because of the state's indication
in its statement of facts that the "personal injury" relied on by the
state was "mental anguish," the defendant moved for a psychological examination of the victim. The trial court ruled that it could not
order the examination requested. To the court of appeals, that determination indicated a failure on the part of the trial court properly to
exercise its discretion. The trial court has authority to order an
examination for mental anguish. Under New Mexico Rules of
Criminal Procedure 29(B) a defendant need not show necessity for
such discovery, but simply that the matter is "relevant" to the offense charged.3" 3 The court of appeals sought to emphasize the narrowness of its holding. The court limited the holding to situations involving "defendant's effort to have the complaining witness examined for 'mental anguish' when the state was relying on mental
anguish as the 'personal injury' which raised the criminal sexual
penetration from a third degree to a second degree felony. '"30 In so
30 which involved "an effort
doing, the court distinguished Romero,"
to obtain an examination directed to the mental condition of the
complaining witness prior to the activities on which the charges
against defendant were based. "306
VIII. DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE AT TRIAL
In three decisions during the Survey period, the New Mexico
courts clarified the defendant's right to be present during various
stages of his criminal trial, as well as the extent of his right to be
absent therefrom. In State v. Garcia,3 0 the trial court denied defendant's request to be present with his attorney during jury selection.
The state supreme court held that such refusal was error because the
defendant had a right to be present when the challenges were made
to the jurors.' The defendant's right to be present at every stage of
trial is grounded in the sixth amendment and applied to the states via
302. Id. The second degree offense charged require penetration "by the use of force or coercion which results in personal injury to the victim." N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-9-11I(B)(2) (1978).
303. New Mexico Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(B) provides that: "Unless otherwise
limited by order of the court, parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the offense charged or the defense of the accused ...
.
304. State v. Garcia, 94 N.M. at 585, 613 P.2d at 727.
305. See note 297 supra.
306. State v. Garcia, 94 N.M. at 585, 613 P.2d at 727. The court also noted that the issue in
Garcia did "not involve an effort to obtain information concerning the prior sex life of the
complaining witness." Id. See State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978).
307. 95 N.M. 246, 620 P.2d 1271 (1980).
308. Id. at 249, 620 P.2d 1274. See N.M. R. Crim. P. Rule 47A: "Defendant shall be present . . . at every stage of trial."
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the fourteenth amendment."0 9 Challenges to the jury array have been
recognized as an essential to fair trial as far back as Lewis v. United
States.3I° Although such right may be waived, 3 ' the court found no
waiver in Garciabecause defendant had objected to his exclusion.
In State v. McClure,3" 2 the trial court received a question from the
jury after it had begun deliberating. After consulting with attorneys
for both parties, the court responded with a written note. Defendant
claimed that a presumption of prejudice arose because of his absence
during both discussion of the question and when the answer was sent
to and received by the jury. He was sleeping in the hallway at the two
critical times. The court of appeals agreed with the defendant. If a
communication to the jury is not made in open court, the defendant
must be present when a written response to the jury is sent. 3 3 In McClure the defendant was not present at that time and therefore a
presumption of prejudice arose. " The court of appeals found that
the state had not overcome that presumption because it failed to
show that the communication did not affect the verdict.3 5
The supreme court held in State v. Larson3" 6 that while defendant
has a right to be present at critical stages of his trial, his "right" to
be absent from trial is subject to the sound discretion of the trial
court. In Larson, the court found no error in the trial court's denial
of the defendant's request to waive his presence before the jury when
he was under medication and his demeanor could have had a negative impact on the jury. The court noted that Rule 47 of the New
Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure does not vest an absolute right
of absence in the defendant." 7 On the contrary, the judge usually
can and should compel the presence of defendant at trial. In unusual
circumstances and for good cause shown the court can permit
absence. Because the record in Larson indicated careful consideration of defendant's request and insufficient cause to justify the
absence, the court found that the trial court had acted within the
bounds of its discretion.31' 8
309. U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
310. 146U.S. 370 (1892).
311. N.M. R. Crim. P. Rule 47B; see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
312. 94 N.M. 440, 612 P.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1980).
313. State v. Saavedra, 93 N.M. 242, 599 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1979).
314. See State v. Orona, 92 N.M. 450, 589 P.2d 1041 (1979); State v. Brugger, 84 N.M. 135,
500 P.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1972), cited in State v. McClure, 94 N.M. 440, 612 P.2d 232 (Ct. App.
1980).
315. 94 N.M. at 442,612 P.2d at 234.
316. 94 N.M. 795, 617 P.2d 1310 (1980).
317. The court relied on interpretations of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43, which is identical to N.M.
R. Crim. P. 47.95 N.M. at 797, 617 P.2d at 1312.
318. 94 N.M. at 797, 617 P.2d at 1312.
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IX. PROBATION REVOCATION
In State v. Sanchez,3 9 the court of appeals held that the probation
revocation process is not subject to speedy trial constitutional provisions, because probation revocation is not part of the criminal trial.
The court reaffirmed that the probation revocation process is subject
to due process protections, where unreasonable delay occurs between knowledge32 0of a probation violation and notice to or arrest of
the probationer.
There are, according to Sanchez, three requirements for a valid
claim of due process violation. First, defendant must make a showing of inordinate delay. Second, the delay must have caused him
some prejudice or oppressive detriment and third, the delay must not
have been brought about by his own fault or lack of diligence.3 2 '
Without indicating the length of the delay which was experienced in
the instant case, the court found no denial of due process in Sanchez
because no claim of prejudice was made. Delay alone does not constitute a sufficient showing.322
The court's conclusion that due process is the appropriate constitutional protection governing probation revocation proceedings is
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's views as expressed in Morrissey v. Brewer3 23 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.32 The
test for determination of denial of due process arising from delay in
bringing probation revocation hearings is similar, however, to that
announced by the United States Supreme Court in dealing with preand post-indictment delay problems.3 25
In State v. Ayala,'26 the trial court assessed jury costs and bailiff's
costs as conditions of probation. The defendant appealed, claiming
that assessment of such costs was not authorized. The court of
319. 94 N.M. 521,612 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App. 1980).
320. Id. at 524, 612 P.2d at 1335. The court relied on State v. Murray, 81 N.M. 445, 468
P.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1970), which held that a defendant whose probation is subject to revocation "is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of a delay between the issuance
and execution of a warrant for defendant's arrest."
321. State v. Sanchez, 94 N.M. at 524,612 P.2d at 1335.
322. The court in Sanchez disapproved State v. Chavez, 94 N.M. 102, 607 P.2d 640 (Ct.
App. 1979), where a denial of due process was found after a delay of five months after the
magistrate conviction. In Sanchez, the court also held that the defendant had waived any
defect in service of notice of the probation revocation hearing by the fact of entry of appearance on his behalf by counsel. Id.
323. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
324. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
325. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), for example, the factors considered included
(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether and when defendant asserted
his right, and (4) the existence of any actual prejudice to defendant.
326. 95 N.M. 464, 623 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1981).
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appeals agreed. Under the New Mexico probation statute, costs may
be authorized as a condition of probation if they are "the actual
costs of . . .probation service not execeeding $200 (two hundred
dollars) annually in one or several intallments." 32 7 The court of
appeals concluded that "probation service" did not include jury and
bailiff costs. A court may only impose conditions of probation
authorized by law. Conditions not so authorized are void.328 Further, assessment of jury and bailiff costs does not reasonably relate
to rehabilitation
relevant to the offense for which probation was
29
3

granted.

Assessable costs under Ayala may include actual costs of supervision and processing within the probation system. It is not clear
whether the cost of a pre-sentence report might be borne by the
defendant as a condition of probation. Such costs lie somewhere between the costs of trial such as jury and bailiff's costs, and costs
incurred by the probation department during actual service of probation.

327. Id. at 465, 623 P.2d 585, citing State v. Holland, 91 N.M. 386, 574 P.2d 605 (Ct. App.
1978), with approval.
328. N.M. Star. Ann. §31-20-6 (1978).
329. State v. Ayala, 95 N.M. at 466, 623 P.2d at 586. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20-6 was
amended in 1981 to require the payment of up to $1020 in actual costs of probation service.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).

